Resolving Property Claims in a Post-Socialist Cuba by Alexander, Kern & Mills, Jon L.
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
Fall 1995
Resolving Property Claims in a Post-Socialist Cuba
Kern Alexander
Jon L. Mills
University of Florida Levin College of Law, mills@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kern Alexander & Jon Mills, Resolving Property Claims in a Post-Socialist Cuba, 27 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 137 (1995), available at
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/702
RESOLVING PROPERTY CLAIMS
IN A POST-SOCIALIST CUBA
KERN ALEXANDER*
JON MILLS**
[, INTRODUCTION
Fundamental disputes over major issues have plagued relations be-
tween the United States and Cuba since Fidel Castro's revolutionary
government took power in 1959. The U.S. government has maintained a
trade embargo against Cuba since 1962' and will not grant diplomatic
recognition 2 until the Cuban government adopts meaningful political
reforms, liberalizes its economy, and compensates expropriated U.S.
entities and individuals who owned property in Cuba.3 In recent years,
* A.B., Cornell University, 1986; M.S., Oxford University, 1990; M.Phil., Cambridge Univer-
sity, 1992;J.D., University of Minnesota, 1994= Currently, Associate at Pattillo & McKeever, Ocala,
Florida.
** B.A., Stetson University, 1969;J.D., University of Florida, 1972; Honorary Doctor of Laws,
Stetson College, 1986. Currently, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Florida and the
Director of the Center for Governmental Responsibility.
1. The trade embargo was enacted pursuant to the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106,
40 Stat. 411 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-5(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The Trading with the Enemy
Act (TWNEA), except for § 5(b), was superseded in 1977 by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). The trade embargo was strengthened in
1992 when President Clinton signed the Cuban Democracy Act, which prohibits foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. companies from trading or investing with Cuba. Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (codified
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-10 (Supp. V 1994)). Moreover, the president has discretion to withhold foreign
aid from any country that provides financial assistance or credit subsidies to Cuba. 22 U.S.C. § 6003.
Most recently, the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, has
proposed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which would allow U.S. citizens, whose
property had been expropriated by the Cuban government, to pursue claims in U.S. courts against
foreigners who have invested in these properties. Christopher Marquis, Raising the Heat on Cuba:
Proposed Law Aims at Investors, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 10, 1995, at 18A. The Helms proposal has received
bi-partisan approval, including support from Senator Bob Graham, D-FL. Id.
2. The U.S. government severed diplomatic relations with Cuba onJanuary 3, 1961, primarily
because the Castro government did not compensate U.S. parties for loss of expropriated property
and, additionally, failed to adopt certain political reforms. Thomas L. Wolfe &John B. White, Income
Tax Consequences of Cuban Expropriations to Cuban Resident Aliens, 19 U. MLaI L. REv. 591, 592
(1964-1965).
3. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act states:
Except as may be deemed necessary by the President in the interest of the United States,
no assistance shall be furnished ... to any government of Cuba, nor shall Cuba be
entitled to receive any quota authorizing the importation of Cuban sugar into the United
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due to the dramatic reduction in Russian financial support and the
failure of many Cuban economic policies, the Cuban government has
adopted certain limited economic reforms to attract foreign investment
and promote economic growth.4
During the summer of 1994, nearly forty thousand Cuban refugees
fled Cuba and arrived in southern Florida.5 As a result, the United
States and Cuba undertook secret negotiations that produced an agree-
ment to end the crisis.6 More recently, the countries secretly negotiated
an agreement that allowed nearly 21,000 Cuban refugees at the U.S.
naval base in Guantanamo Bay to migrate to the United States and
required the U.S. government to repatriate all future Cuban refugees
who attempt to enter the United States illegally by sea.' By entering
States or to receive any other benefit under any law of the United States, until the
President determined that such government has taken appropriate steps according to
international law standards to return to United States citizens, and to entities not less
than 50 per centum beneficially owned by United States citizens, or to provide equitable
compensation to such citizens and entities for property taken from such citizens and
entities on or afterJanuary 1, 1959, by the Government of Cuba.
22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2) (1988). See also 22 U.S.C. § 283r (1988) (directing the U.S. government's
representative to international financial institutions to oppose all loans and loan guarantees to
expropriating governments that have not compensated expropriated investors in conformity with
international law).
4. Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Islands of Capitalism in an Ocean of Socialism: Joint Ventures in Cuba's
Development Strategy, in CUBA AT A CROSSROADS 191-95 (Jorge F. Perez-Lopez ed., 1994). In 1982, the
Cuban Council of State established a legal framework for foreign investment, which authorized the
creation of joint ventures between Cuban entities and foreign interests in order to promote
economic growth. Id. The amount of foreign investment has increased dramatically. See Foreign
Registered Businesses in Cuba, CUBA REPORT (Cuba Newsletter, Inc., Miami, FL), Oct. 1993, at 1, 6.
5. Patricia Zengerle, U.S. Base Prepares for Transfer of Cubans, REUTERS LIMITED, BC CYCLE,Jan.
10, 1995, available in Lexis, CURNWS Library; Marquis, supra note 1, at 18A (reporting that Cuban
refugees used boats and rafts to cross the Florida Straits from June to August in 1995).
6. The 1994 influx of Cuban "boat people" into Florida was reminiscent of the 1980 Mariel
boatlift in which over 125,000 Cubans illegally entered southern Florida and caused immense
embarrassment to the Carter administration. In response to the 1994 crisis, the Clinton administra-
tion undertook ad hoc negotiations with the Cuban government, leading to an agreement to increase
the annual immigration quota for Cubans seeking residency in the United States to 20,000 in
return for Cuba's best efforts at reducing the mass exodus. Christopher Marquis, Cuba Agrees to End
the Exodus, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 10, 1994, available in Westlaw, MIA-HRLD Database. See also,
Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 89 AM.J.
INT'L L. 96, 99-100 (1995). The U.S. government also agreed to place all Cuban refugees found at
sea in the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo nay, Cuba. Id. at 100.
7. Joe Davidson et al., White House, Reversing Policy, to Let Most Cubans at Guantanamo Immigrate,
WALL ST. J., May 3, 1995, at A3. The agreement allows most of the 21,000 Cuban refugees at the
Guantanamo naval base in Cuba to obtain permanent resident status in the U.S. and requires that
[Vol. 27
RESOLVING PROPERTY CLAIMS IN A POST-SOCIALIST CUBA
into this agreement, the U.S. government reversed a long-standing
policy of providing political asylum to all Cuban refugees who fled
Cuba.8 Although the United States disavows any intention to grant
diplomatic recognition to Cuba, these recent agreements portend a new
and higher degree of cooperation between the two countries in resolving
other festering issues.' Moreover, as Cuban economic and social condi-
tions continue to deteriorate, the Cuban government has shown a
willingness to adopt certain political reforms, should the United States
end its trade embargo. These occurrences suggest that a major political
transformation may occur in the near future.'
As part of completing its transition into a post-socialist market
economy, a future Cuban government must adopt a policy that, in some
way, will address claims for expropriated property arising out of the
1959 revolution. In setting out a course of action to achieve this
objective, the issues and problems that have confronted other post-
socialist governments provide critical reference points. Some post-
socialist states have enacted compensation laws that may violate interna-
tional law by prohibiting specified groups of foreigners from asserting
property claims."1 Some post-socialist states have enacted laws favoring
all future Cuban refugees found at sea be returned to Cuba. Id. High-level delegations of officials
from both governments negotiated the agreement. Parties to the negotiation included Under-
Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff, the third-ranking official in the State Department, and Ricardo
Alarcon, the Chairman of Cuba's National Assembly. Steven Greenhouse, First Step on Cuba?, N.Y.
TImES, May 4, 1995, at A3.
8. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Will Return Refugees to Cuba in Policy Switch, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1995, at Al. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h) (1994). The Cuban Adjustment Act effectively allowed all Cuban
refugees to have their non-immigrant, political refugee status adjusted to the immigrant status of
lawful, permanent resident of the United States. The part of the Act relevant to most Cuban
refugees defines a refugee as a person who (a) is either outside of the country of nationality or has
no nationality and is outside of the country in which that person last habitually resided and (b) "is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution, or a well-founded fear of persecution, on account
of... political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(42) (1994).
9. See Steven Greenhouse, U.S.-Cuban Cooperation Noted: New Immigration Policy May Open Door to
Broader Topics, HOUSTON CHRON., May 4, 1995, at A20; Jose de Cordoba & Carla Anne Robbins,
Clinton, Congress Set to Collide on Cuba, WALL ST.J. May 4, 1995, at A9. The U.S. policy of returning
Cuban boat people has enraged many Cuban Americans who feel that all Cubans escaping their
homeland should be treated as refugees under U.S. law, thereby becoming eligible for permanent
resident status. Id.
10. Douglas Farah, Foreign Investors Finding Cuba More Comfortable with U.S. Away, WASH. POST,
Sept. 12, 1995, at A14.
1I. See Arbitration Between the State of Kuwait and the American Independent Oil Co.
(Aminoil), 21 I.L.M. 976, 1019-20 (1982) [hereinafter Aminoil] (finding that nationalizing one
company but not another did not violate international law when there was no discrimination based
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restitution as opposed to compensation as a remedy for expropriated claim-
ants, resulting in considerable confusion over who owns what property. 12
Based on these experiences, this Article assumes that a future Cuban
government will provide some form of remedy-either restitution in
kind or compensation-to expropriated property owners. In designing a
program to reprivatize expropriated property, the relevant laws of the
Cuban legal system and the rules of international law governing expro-
priation and compensation will be important for determining the degree
to which, if at all, compensation or property is to be awarded to
expropriated claimants.13 In the event that a future Cuban government
fails to comply with international law, it is reasonable to surmise that
unsettled property claims will deter foreign investors from investing in
Cuba, thereby causing the Cuban economy to suffer.
This Article analyzes some of the major Cuban and international legal
issues confronting U.S. and Cuban claimants whose property was expro-
priated by the Cuban government. Part II reviews the history of the
Cuban nationalizations and examines the historical development of the
property protection provisions of the Cuban Constitution. Part III
on the nationality of the two companies and there were "adequate reasons" for distinguishing
between them); International Arbitral Tribunal: Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. and the Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic (U.S. v. Libya), 17 I.L.M. 1, 21-22 (1978) [hereinafter Texaco] (stating "the decision of a
State to take nationalizing measures constitutes the exercise of an internal legal jurisdiction but
carries international consequences when such measures affect international legal relationships in
which the nationalizing State is involved"). For a discussion of such compensation laws in Poland
and Czechoslovakia, as well as other former Eastern Bloc countries, see infa notes 122-41 and
accompanying text.
12. For a description of this problem in East Germany, see infra notes 218-22 and accompany-
ing text.
13. The terms "expropriation" and "nationalization" have been used interchangeably and
with the same meaning, namely, a state's direct taking of private property. However, in their
specific application, terms take on different meanings. A nationalization occurs when a state takes
private property as part of a large scale program of economic or social reform. The nationalization
usually applies to a whole industry or economic sector. Isi FOIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION AND COMPEN-
SATION 18-26 (1963). An expropriation occurs in a more specific context, however, when the
government takes a specific property with or without compensation. See GILLIAN WHITE, NATIONAL-
IZATI1ON OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 11-24 (1961). Both terms essentially refer to a government's direct
taking of private property.
Some authors use the term "confiscation" to mean a per se unlawful government taking of
property without compensation. See Matias Travieso Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the
Resolution of Cuban Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 217, 220
(1995). Other authors, however, define confiscation in a broader sense to include an uncompensated
taking of private property by the state in the exercise of its police powers or as a criminal sanction. Since
expropriations can occur without compensation, we will use the terms "expropriation" and "nationaliza-
tion" in a broader sense, covering most instances of direct takings of property.
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analyzes the implications of deciding which Cuban legal system should
apply to the claims of expropriated property owners.
Part IV discusses the legal and procedural barriers to recovering
expropriated property, focusing upon international law of claimant
eligibility, abandonment of property, and compensation to expropriated
investors. This Part also analyzes both the relevant rules of Cuban
property law and the laws enacted by other post-socialist governments to
address the claims of expropriated property owners. In addition, the authors
discuss policy options, available to a future Cuban government, which would
enable former property owners to receive some form of compensation.
Part V recommends that, for the most effective and equitable resolu-
tion of the property claims of Cuban and U.S. claimants, the Cuban and
U.S. governments should agree to submit all such claims to an interna-
tional arbitration tribunal. The two governments could authorize such a
tribunal to adjudicate all Cuban and U.S. claims based upon rules of
public international law and those domestic laws the tribunal deems
appropriate. Such an agreement could provide expropriated Cuban and
U.S. claimants with some realistic chance to recover compensation. To
enter such an agreement, however, the U.S. government would have to
negotiate with a government that it currently does not officially recog-
nize. 14 As recent events have shown, the United States is willing to
negotiate secretly with Cuba but avoids public exposure due to the
political unpopularity of negotiating directly with the Castro regime.
Because any resolution to the thousands of property claims will necessar-
ily involve public scrutiny, U.S. policy makers will have to decide when
14. Although it is unlikely to enter into negotiations with Cuba in the near future, the U.S.
government has in the past negotiated secretly with states with whom it had no official diplomatic
relations. For example, in 1979, after the Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary government took
power, Iran nationalized many sectors of its economy and expropriated many foreign-owned
businesses. See generally Christine M. Chinkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the U.S. President and the
Iranian Hostage Agreement: Dames & Moore v. Regan, 32 INT'L & CONI'. L.Q. 600 (1983). U.S. citizens
and companies lost property worth over $65 million. S.H. Amin, Iran-United States Claims Settlement,
32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 750, 750 (1983). President Carter responded by signing an order freezing all
Iranian-owned assets, both in the United States and in U.S.-owned subsidiaries abroad, and
suspending all diplomatic relations with Iran. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 655-58
(1981) (upholding the president's power under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
to order that all U.S. claims against Iran be submitted to an Iran-United States claims tribunal).
The U.S. government, however, undertook secret negotiations with the Iranian government that
culminated in the United States-Iran Claims Settlement and Hostage Agreement of January 20,
1981. The Agreement required that all U.S. claims against the Iranian government be heard before
an Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1981, at 1, reprinted in Official Documents:
Settlement ofthe Iran Hostage Crisis, 75 AM.J. INT'L L. 418 (1 98 1) [hereinafter Algiers Declaration].
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the benefits of undertaking official negotiations with Cuba outweigh the
political criticism that will accompany negotiations. This Article argues
that whenever such negotiations begin, the most efficient and equitable
resolution of expropriated property claims will be brought about through
a Cuban-U.S. claims tribunal.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. The Cuban Nationalizations
On January 1, 1959, revolutionary forces led by Fidel Castro over-
threw the Cuban government of Fulgencio Batista. 15 After amending
and reactivating the Cuban Constitution of 1940 as part of a new
Fundamental Law, the revolutionary government began an incremental
process of collectivizing the economy. 16 During 1959, the government
confiscated the property and assets of former Cuban public officials. 17 In
addition, the government passed the first Agrarian Reform Law of 1959,
which expropriated all large farms in excess of 400 hectares. 8 Although
the law provided for compensation in the form of twenty year bonds, no
compensation was ever paid to expropriated landowners. 9
Next, as part of a more concerted effort to strengthen government
15. See generally HUGH THOMAS, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 243-49 (1977).
"16. MICHAEL GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
CUBA 71-75 (1976). The Fundamental Law was enacted on February 7, 1959, and, although it
technically replaced the 1940 Constitution, it retained most of its basic provisions in amended form,
some of which were altered to promote the government's new ideological agenda. See id. at 71;
Nicolas J. Gutierrez, Jr., The De-Constitutionalization of Property Rights: Castro's Systematic
Assault On Private Ownership in Cuba 3-7 (unpublished paper submitted at Cuba in Transition:
Options for Addressing the Challenge of Expropriated Properties, Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Ass'n Section of Int'l Law & Practice, Aug. 9, 1994) (on file with Law and Policy in International
Business). Batista suspended the 1940 constitution in 1953 so that he could govern Cuba in an
authoritarian manner. THOMAS, supra note 15, at 3-4; see also CARMELO MESA-LAGO, THE ECONOMY
OF SOCIALIST CUBA: A Two DECADE APPRAISAL 12 (1981) [hereinafter MESA-LAGO, SOCIALIST CUBA].
17. GORDON, supra note 16, at 73 n. 17 (including the President, Vice President, all cabinet
members, and all Senators and Representatives). Some of the property confiscated had been
embezzled. See MESA-LAGO, SOCIALIST CUBA, supra note 16, at 12. However, some government
officials whose property was confiscated were guilty of nothing more than having served in the
Batista government. GORDON, supra note 16, at 73.
18. MESA-LAGO, SOCIALIST CUBA, supra note 16, at 12. The Agrarian Reform Law was finalized
on June 4, 1959, limiting ownership in land to small- and medium-sized farms, cooperatives, and
special arrangements deemed to be in the best interests of Cuban economic progress. GORDON,
supra note 16, at 75.
19. GORDON, supra note 16, at 76. The law provided that the bonds would accrue at 4.5%
interest, payable in non-convertible instruments. Id.
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control over the economy, the government expropriated all rental
housing and seized factories and warehouses that it deemed aban-
doned.2" The government created several agencies authorized to in-
crease state control of the economy. 2 1 On July 6, 1960, as tensions
reached a climax between the Cuban and U.S. governments, 22 the U.S.
Congress passed a new sugar law granting the president broad authority
to adjust the Cuban sugar quota to any level. 23 On the same day, just a
few hours before President Eisenhower decided to drastically reduce the
sugar quota, Castro announced the nationalization of all properties
owned by U.S. nationals.2 4 By the end of 1961, the Cuban government
had extended its collectivization program to reach most Cuban owned
industries, all foreign-owned refineries, and all U.S.-owned properties,
including sugar mills, banks, railroads, and telephone and electric
companies. 25 The expropriations measures and the failure of the 1961
20. MESA-LAGO, SOCIALIST CUBA, supra note 16, at 12-13. The Urban Reform Law of October
14, 1960 authorized the expropriation of all rental housing. Ley de Reforma Urbana, published in
Gaceta Oficial, Oct. 14, 1960, spec. ed., at L. The Cuban law that authorized the expropriation of all
abandoned property was Law 989 of December 5, 1961. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying
text. The government, however, did not seize small parcels of land, homes, or personal property
owned by Cuban nationals who did not flee the country after the revolution. Diaz, supra note 13, at
219. Moreover, currency controls were imposed in September of 1959 that prohibited the transfer of
funds abroad. GORDON, supra note 16, at 79.
21. MESA-LAGO, SOCIALIST CUBA, supra note 16, at 12. The most prominent agency was the
National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA). Id. Although the INRA was authorized to imple-
ment rules for compensating expropriated landowners, it never implemented any compensation
program.
22. See GORDON, supra note 16, at 98. On that day, the U.S. government had reduced Cuba's
sugar quota in the United States. Id. The Cuban government responded immediately by passing
Law No. 851, which authorized expropriation measures against all U.S.-owned property. BARRY E.
CARTER & PHILUP R. TaissaLE, INTERiNATIONAL LAw 1535 (1991) (discussing Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)).
23. An Act to amend the Sugar Act of 1948, 74 Stat. 330 (1960); GORDON, supra note 16, at 97
(The bill gave the President this authority until March 31, 1961.). Moreover, onJune 30, 1960, the
Cuban government had intervened in the management of all foreign-owned oil refineries that had
refused to process crude oil imported from the Soviet Union. See id. at 94-96.
24. GORDON, supra note 16, at 98-99. President Eisenhower reduced the remaining Cuban
sugar quota for 1960 from 739,752 tons to 39,752 tons, which resulted in a signifcant loss of sales for
the Cuban government. Id. The nationalization of U.S. properties was enacted in accordance with
the Fundamental Law of 1959. The law authorized the payment of compensation by the issuance of
30 year bonds with 2% interest, whereas the Agrarian Reform Law had authorized the issuance of
20 year bonds paying 4.5% interest. Id. at 98. The government, however, failed to fulfill its
obligations under the Agraian Reform Law and the Fundamental Law to provide compensation to
expropriated property owners. Id.
25. U.S. corporations that had investments expropriated by the Cuban government included:
General Motors, Chrysler, Ford, IBM, AT&T, RCA, Eastman Kodak, United Fruit, Avon Products,
19951
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Bay of Pigs invasion led the U.S. government to break diplomatic
relations with Cuba in 1961 and impose a trade embargo in 1962.26 By
enacting the second Agrarian Reform Law in 1963, which nationalized
all farms larger than sixty-seven hectares, the revolutionary government
essentially completed the liquidation of the former capitalist system.
27
In 1964, Congress amended the 1954 Foreign Claims Settlement Act,
authorizing the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) to
administer and adjudicate all U.S. claims for expropriated property in
Cuba.28 Today, there are an estimated 8000 outstanding property claims
held by Cubans2 9 and foreign nationals against the Cuban govern-
ment.3 0 Though Cuba has concluded lump sum settlement agreements
Gillette, Woolworth, and Proctor & Gamble. Sidney Freidberg & Bert Lockwood,Jr., The Measure of
Damages in Claims Against Cuba, in I THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 117 n.3 (R. Lillich ed., 1972).
26. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-10 (Supp. V 1994); CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 22, at 635; Cf
BORIS GOLDENBERG, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND LATIN AMERICA 261-75 (1965).
27. See MESA-LAGO, SOCIALIST CUBA, supra note 16, at 14-15. Later, in 1966, the Cuban
government infringed upon intellectual property rights by taking the copyrights of works of authors
who were nationals of countries that had broken relations with Cuba. GORDON, supra note 16, at 107.
The government's nationalization program reached a conclusion in March 1968 when Castro
announced that all small private businesses would be outlawed, with the exception of some small
agricultural businesses. Id.
28. See The Cuban Claims Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 1110 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1643 et seq.
(Supp. V 1994)). Pursuant to Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, Congress
authorized the International Claims Commission (ICC) to adjudicate and administer certain
expropriation claims held by U.S. entities. 78 Stat. 1110-11, 22 U.S.C. § 1643b(b). The ICC was
renamed in 1954, becoming the FCSC. In 1964, Congress authorized the FCSC to administer and
adjudicate against the Cuban government expropriation claims belonging only to U.S. nationals or
companies organized under U.S. law whose claims arose on or after January 1, 1959. 22 U.S.C.
§ 1643c(a).
29. Cuban expatriates hold claims with an estimated value of around US$6.9 billion, based on
values recorded in 1957, with an estimated value in 1993 of over US$20 billion. Jose F. Alonso &
Armando M. Lago, A First Approximation of the Foreign Assistance Requirements of a Democratic Cuba, in 3
CUBA IN TRANSMON 202-04 (George P. Montalvan ed., 1994).
30. At present, the U.S. government has certified 5911 claims of U.S. entities (U.S. citizens or
companies) against the Cuban government for property that was valued at US$1.8 billion. Delissa
A. Ridgway, Historical Development Perspective of U.S. Expropriation Claims Against Cuba,
Remarks at Cuba in Transition Workshop 12 (Jan. 26, 1995) (transcript available at Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trobridge and on file with Law and Policy in International Business). Because all adjudicated
claims bear simple interest at the statutory rate of six percent, the Cuban expropriation claims that
are registered with the FCSC are now worth more than $5.6 billion. FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT
COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE CUBAN CLAIMS PROGRAM 412 (1972); cf. Ridgway, supra, at 12
(discussing those claims). By law, the claims of non-U.S, nationals and entities cannot be
adjudicated by the FCSC unless Congress amends the Claims Act to provide that such non-U.S.
claimants can in fact invoke the protection of the U.S. government in certain proceedings. For a
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with a few nations, including France, Switzerland, and Spain,3' no such
agreement has been made with the United States or Cuban expatriates.
In gauging the magnitude of Cuba's expropriations, it is helpful to note
that the value of the Cuban takings far exceeded the value of property
expropriated by the nations of Eastern Europe after World War II and
by the Soviet Union after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution.
B. Comparison to East European Nationalizations
Because the experiences of the former Communist countries of
Central and Eastern Europe provide a context in which to assess the
parameters of any future program to resolve Cuban property claims, the
expropriation history of the region will be outlined briefly. As did
Castro's government in Cuba, the Communist governments that came
to power in Eastern Europe during the late 1940s enacted large-scale
33
nationalization programs covering many sectors of their economies.
Especially in the case of agricultural expropriations, those states as-
sumed owership of many large private agricultural holdings, often
without providing compensation. 34 Other East European Communist
governments expropriated non-agricultural properties without provid-
ing any compensation. 35 Since 1989, most of the post-socialist regimes in
Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States have
discussion of agreements to waive the nationality requirements of the standing rule, see infra notes
113-21 and accompanying text.
31. Freidberg & Lockwood, supra note 25, at 129. See RicHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS WESTON,
INTERNATIONAL CLAiMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SuM AGREEMENTS 208-14, 239 (1975) (discuss-
ing the inadequacy of lump sum settlements in compensating losses). The Spanish government
signed a lump sum agreement with Cuba that settled over US$350 million in Spanish claims forjust
over US$40 million. Diaz, supra note 13, at 221 n. 14.
32. See FREIDBERG & LOCKWOOD, supra note 25, at 129.
33. See, e.g., Katherine Simonetti et al., Compensation and Resolution of Property Claims in
Hungary 61, 61-63 (unpublished paper submitted at Cuba in Transition: Options for Addressing
the Challenge of Expropriated Properties, Annual Meeting of the American Bar Ass'n Section of
Int'l Law & Practice, Aug. 9, 1994) (on file with Law and Policy in International Business) (discussing
major Hungarian nationalizations of agricultural, mining, industrial, and other facilities and
massive real and personal property expropriations); Ewa Gmurzynska, Reprivatization in Po-
land-An Example for Cuba? 33, 37-44 (unpublished paper submitted at Cuba in Transition:
Options for Addressing the Challenge of Expropriated Properties, Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Ass'n Section of Int'l Law & Practice Annual Meeting, Aug. 9, 1994) (on file with Law and Policy
in International Business) (discussing Polish nationalization and expropriation laws).
34. See, e.g., Simonetti et al.,supra note 33, at 62; Gmurzynska,supra note 33, at 37-44.
35. Cf Mark Ellis, Drafting Constitutions: Property Rights in Central and Eastern Europe, 19 Y&L.tJ
INT'L L. 197 (1994) (comparing the constitutional rights of property ownership among Eastern
European nations).
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enacted reprivatization laws providing some form of compensation or
restitution in kind to specified groups of former property owners. 36 Even
though most post-Communist countries maintain an official policy of
restitution or compensation, difficult issues have emerged over the
standard of compensation to apply and the eligibility of claimants.
C. Property Protection Under the Cuban Constitution
Cuba's first constitution as an independent nation was enacted in
1901.37 The 1901 Constitution's property protection provision, Article
32, provided that no person could be deprived of property unless a
competent government based the deprivation on a just cause, had a
public purpose, and indemnified the owner. 38 Similarly, the framers of
the 1940 Cuban Constitution enshrined the right to property as a
natural right-guaranteeing to all Cubans the right to own and use
property freely.39 The two most important provisions protecting prop-
erty are Articles 24 and 87.
Under Article 24, a government taking of property without judicial
determination of just cause and public purpose is illegal, and any
government taking must be accompanied by "indemnity in cash.",40 If
36. See id.
37. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1901) [Constitution] art. 32 (Cuba), translated in
BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1900-1901 554 (Augustus H. Oakes & Willoughby Maycock eds.,
1904) [hereinafter CONsTrucION DE 1901]. See Rebeca Sanchez-Roig, Cuban Constitutionalism
and Rights: An Overview of the Constitutions of 1901 and 1940 7 (unpublished paper submitted at
Cuba in Transition: Options for Addressing the Challenge of Expropriated Properties, Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Ass'n Section on Int'l Law & Practice, Aug. 9, 1994) (on file with Law
and Policy in International Business). Before 1940, Cuba had been governed by eight constitutions and
various reforms, amendments, and statutes, most of which were enacted by Cuban revolutionary
leaders who had sought Cuban independence from Spanish colonial rule. Id. at 4-8.
38. CONSTITUCION DE 1901 art. 32.
39. See Ignacio E. Sanchez, Constitutional Protection of Cuban Property Rights 6 (unpub-
lished paper submitted at Cuba in Transition: Options for Addressing the Challenge of Expropri-
ated Properties, Annual Meeting of the American Bar Ass'n Section on Int'l Law & Practice, Aug. 9,
1994) (on file with Law and Policy in International Business).
40. The specific language of Article 24 reads:
Confiscation of property is prohibited. No one can be deprived of his property except by
competent judicial authority and for a justified cause of public utility or social interest,
and always after the payment of the corresponding indemnity in cash, as fixed by a court.
CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1940) [Constitutionl art. 24 (Cuba), translated in 1
CONSTITUIONS OF NATIONS 626 (Amos J. Peasle ed., 2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter CONSTITUCION DE
1940].
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the government fails to comply with these requirements, the dispos-
sessed owner may be entitled to restitution of his or her property.a
4
Article 87 recognizes the right to "private property in its broadest
concept," which cannot be limited except for public necessity or for
"social interest" as established by law.4 2
In addition, Articles 285 and 286 of the 1940 Constitution impose
comprehensive procedures for amending the Constitution-procedures
that preserve the importance of the property protections. Article 285
provides alternative procedures for initiating the amendment process: a
proposed amendment must be either signed by at least 100,000 people
or by at least one-fourth of Congress. 4 3 Once the process has begun,
Article 286 sets forth the procedure for ratifying a proposed amend-
ment.4 4 After the people initiate a "partial" or "specific" amendment,
the amendment must be submitted to a referendum at the next general
election. A partial amendment initiated by the Congress must be
approved by a vote of two-thirds of both the House and the Senate in a
joint assembly.45 A total revision of the Constitution, however, requires
the election of delegates to attend a constitutional assembly where they
address all issues pertaining to a complete revision of the Constitu-
tion.4 6
On March 10, 1952, Batista overthrew the government of President
Prios by leading a military coup d'etat.47 In April of 1952, Batista issued a
Constitutional Act repealing the 1940 Constitution and its property
protection provisions. 4 ' Batista appointed a Council of Ministers that
41. See id.
42. Article 87 stated:
The Cuban nation recognizes the existence and legitimacy of private property in its
broadest concept as a social function and without other limitations than those which, for
reasons of public necessity or social interest, are established by law.
CONSTITUCION DE 1940 art. 87; see also INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OFJURISTS, CUBA AND THE RULE OF
LAw 7, 80, 87 (1962) [hereinafterJURISTS] (discussing the 1940 Cuban Constitution and subsequent
amendments).
Articles 88-96 are the remaining provisions addressing other specific property rights, such as
intellectual property and "latifundos" (large landholdings). CONSTrrucTION DE 1940.
43. CONSTriUcION DE 1940 art. 285.
44. Id. art. 286.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. JURsTs, supra note 42, at 82; Sanchez, supra note 39, at 10.
48. SeeJURISTS, supra note 42, at 83.
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had the power to amend the Constitutional Act by a two-thirds vote.4 9
Although the newly-appointed Council of Ministers reenacted many of
the provisions of the 1940 constitution, it did not reinstate the Constitu-
tion's property protection provisions. 50 Batista's seizure of power had
the practical political effect of abrogating the property protection
provisions of the 1940 Constitution without following the amendment
procedures set forth in Articles 285 and 286.
After Castro came to power, the Fundamental Law of 1959 replaced
the 1940 Constitution and essentially reenacted Article 24, which pro-
vided that the state may only take private property for a public purpose
and if compensation is paid. Significantly, the new version authorized
government agencies other than the judiciary to expropriate private
property.5 1 Nevertheless, the amended version of Article 24 required the
government to pay compensation, either in bonds or in cash.5 2 As we
know, however, compensation was never paid.
Some observers have argued that because property rights were made
fundamental rights under Articles 24 and 87, changes to those articles
constitute a complete revision of the Constitution and thereby require a
constitutional convention.5 3 Therefore, they argue, Castro's appoint-
ment of ministers, who could amend the 1940 Constitution by enacting a
Fundamental Law, usurped the authority granted under the 1940
Constitution.54 Accordingly, under this view, the provisions of the
Fundamental Law amending the property protection provisions of the
1940 Constitution are void and the terms of the original 1940 Constitu-
tion are still law. Yet, whether the Fundamental Law of 1959 is valid or
the original 1940 Constitution is still the law of the land, compensation
was required but not paid.
49. Sanchez, supra note 39, at 10-11.
50. See id.
51. JURISTS, supra note 42, at 103-04; Diaz, supra note 13, at 232 n.51. In fact the Fundamental
Law retained most of the original Article 24 language. In the original 1940 text, Article 24 provided
that only a "competent judicial authority" could authorize the expropriation of property, whereas
the Fundamental Law was amended in 1960 to delete the term "judicial" and to add the terms
"competent authority." Id. Thus, any competent Cuban government agency or official could
authorize an expropriation so long as it was in the public interest and compensation was paid. See id.
52. GORDON, supra note 16, at 70-77.
53. See Sanchez, supra note 39, at 9-10; Cf Gutierrez, supra note 16, at 4-8 (describing a
constitutional challenge to the Agrarian Reform Act ofJune 3, 1959 as violative of Articles 24 and 87
of the Constitution).
54. Cf Gutierez, supra note 16, at 6-7 (suggesting that the Ministers' actions received
automatic approval from the "Castro-controlled judiciary").
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Complicating matters, Castro decreed a new Communist constitution
in 1976, wherein he essentially codified the government's de facto policy
of refusing to compensate expropriated property owners. 55 Before 1976,
the government's refusal to pay compensation for the expropriation
measures taken pursuant to the Fundamental Law of 1959 had been
considered a temporary deviation from the general requirement that
compensation be made to expropriated owners. The 1976 Constitution,
however, replaced the 1959 Fundamental Law and eliminated most of
the government's obligations under previous Cuban law to compensate
former property owners.
5 6
Article 9 of the 1976 Constitution provides that all laws "are to echo
only the will of the working people" and that only "socialist legality"
binds the state.5 7 Article 9 provides broad powers for the state to control
most aspects of social and economic activity.58 Article 14 prescribes
general principles for a socialist economy that include "the socialist
ownership" of "the means of production" and the "abolition of the
exploitation of man by man." 59 Article 15 eliminates any property rights
that expropriated claimants may have had by specifying which proper-
ties became "irreversibly established" as property of "the entire people":
The socialist state property, which is the property of the entire
people, becomes irreversibly established over the lands that do
not belong to the small farmers or to cooperatives formed by the
same; over the subsoil, mines, the natural resources and flora
and fauna in the marine area over which it has jurisdiction,
woods, the waters, means of communication; over the sugar
mills, factories, chief means of transportation; and over all those
enterprises, banks, installations and properties that have been
nationalized and expropriated from the imperialists, the land-
holders and the bourgeoisie; as well as over the people's farms,
factories, enterprises and economic, social, cultural and sports
facilities built, fostered or purchased by the state and those
which will be built, fostered or purchased by the state in the
55. CONsTrrucION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1976) [Constitution] art. 4 (Cuba), translated in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: CUBA 1, 9 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz
eds., Pamela Falk trans., 1979) [hereinafter CONsTrrUClON DE 1976].
56. Id.
57. CONSTrrUCION DE 1976 art. 9;see Gutierrez, supra note 16, at 13.
58. CONSTrrUCION DE 1976 art. 9; see Gutierrez, supra note 16, at 13.
59. CONSTITUCION DE 1976 art. 14.
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future. 60
In sum, the state's power to take private property without compensation
was broadened by the 1976 Constitution. In 1992, the Cuban govern-
ment, responding to a dramatic reduction in Russian subsidies and the
continued deterioration of the Cuban economy, authorized the establish-
ment of empresas mixtas, which are joint business ventures with foreign
entities.6 Empresas mixtas usually award a controlling interest to the
Cuban government and allow foreigners to invest capital in certain
industries, such as tourism, mining, communications, real estate, petro-
leum, manufacturing, sugar, and construction.6 2 In addition, Article 15
of the 1976 Constitution was amended to authorize a form of "state
capitalism" to foster the creation of empresas mixtas.63
This review of Cuban legal history demonstrates the confusion that
exists over the legal status of private property ownership in Cuba.
Before Batista's coup d'etat in 1952, the Cuban Constitution had a strong
legal framework for protecting private property rights. But the combina-
tion of Batista's abrogation of the property protection provisions of the
1940 Constitution, coupled with Castro's refusal in the early 1960s to
abide by the compensation requirements of Cuba's new laws, signifi-
cantly eroded private property protections under Cuban law. The dam-
age caused by this erosion of constitutional property protection is
exacerbated by the looming questions about the procedural legality of
the various constitutional amendments that have affected private prop-
erty expropriation and compensation. Resolution of the expropriation
claims will turn largely on which system of Cuban laws will be applied to
claimants.
60. CONSTITUCION DE 1976 art. 25. Article 25 also mentions compensation for expropriation:
The expropriation of property for reasons of public benefit or social interest and with due
compensation is authorized.
The law establishes the method for the expropriation and the bases on which the need
for and usefulness of this action are to be determined, as well as the form of compensa-
tion, taking into account the interest and the economic and social needs of the person
whose property has been expropriated.
Id. Although Article 25 recognizes the principle of compensation, it provides the government with
discretion in deciding the amount of compensation, based on the "interests and economic and social
needs of the owner." Id.
61. Cf Perez-Lopez, supra note 4, at 195-98 (discussing recent joint ventures in tourism,
services, and manufacturing).
62. Gutierrez, supra note 16, at 14-15.
63. See CONSTrrUCION DE 1976 art. 15.
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III. WHICH CUBAN LEGAL SYSTEM SHOULD APPLY To CLAIMANTS?
A future Cuban government will have to decide which system of
Cuban law to apply to expropriation claims. As demonstrated by other
post-Communist governments, such as those of Poland, Latvia, and
Hungary, one of three different methods can be applied to expropriation
claims: (1) use the laws of the pre-Communist government to determine
the legality of the taking; (2) determine whether the Communist state
violated its own laws when taking its citizens' property or; (3) apply the
legal system of the new post-Communist government to determine the
legality of the taking. Former Cuban property owners therefore should
understand the implications of determining which legal system applies
to their claims.
A. Did the Taking Violate Pre-Communist Law?
To address the claims of former property owners, Poland has applied
the laws of pre-1939 Poland.6 4 This policy derives from a legal tradition
that respects the concept of the continuity of law. Many of today's Polish
laws were enacted during the pre-World War II era and were main-
tained by the Communist regime. 65 The post-Communist government
has also decided to maintain the laws adopted during the Communist
era that do not violate the laws that were in effect in pre-1939 Poland.66
Today's Polish government recognizes expropriations performed during
the Communist era provided that they were not undertaken in violation
of pre-1939 Polish laws.6 7
Following this approach, lawyers for Cuban expatriates have argued
that the Castro expropriations were illegal under the property provi-
sions of the 1940 Cuban Constitution. Article 24 of the 1940 Constitu-
tion protected the right of private property and permitted the govern-
ment to take property only if it offered indemnification or compensation
to its owners.
68
Despite Batista's suspension of the 1940 Constitution and the subse-
quent failure to reenact its property protection provisions, the Castro
64. See Gmurzynska, supra note 33, at 53 (discussing the Polish Commercial Code of 1934,
which has been the foundation for legal regulation of commercial activity in pre-Communist,
Communist, and post-Communist Poland).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. In fact, until 1994, the Communist Constitution of 1952 remained in force, although it had
been amended substantially. Id.
68. For a discussion of property rights in the 1940 Cuban Constitution, see supra notes 39-42
and accompanying text.
1995]
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
government essentially reenacted those property provisions in 1959,
though with significantly amended language. 69 Among these changes
brought by the 1959 Fundamental Law was the addition of Article 232,
which authorized the Council of Ministers, with the approval of its
president, to amend the Constitution without following the amendment
procedures set forth in Articles 285 and 286 of the Constitution.7 0 Recall
that under the 1940 Constitution all constitutional amendments re-
quired a super-majority of the National Assembly or the convening of a
plebiscitary assembly. 7' The Council of Ministers thereafter amended
Article 24 to permit the nationalization of property belonging to "natu-
ral persons or corporate bodies liable for offenses against the national
economy or public treasury. . ." 2 The changing of the 1940 Constitu-
tion's amendment process and the subsequent amending of the Consti-
tution to allow the nationalization of property made the Council of
Ministers' actions technically invalid under the law of pre-revolutionary
Cuba. The Council impermissibly changed the 1940 Constitution's
amendment process and then used that improper process to "constitu-
tionalize" the nationalization of private property.
Under another approach, the laws authorizing the expropriations
could be considered null and void because the Castro government was
not duly constituted in accordance with the 1940 Constitution. The
weakness of this argument is that it fails to recognize the significance of
Batista's suspension of the Constitution before the 1959 revolution and
the refusal of his Council of Ministers to reenact its property provisions.
69. Gutierrez, supra note 16, at 2-3. The 1959 Fundamental Law authorized Castro to appoint
a Council of Ministers, which had the power to enact laws to enforce the Fundamental Law and to
amend the provisions of the 1940 Constitution, most of which had been reenacted in the language
of the Fundamental Law. Id. For further discussion of the Fundamental Law as it relates to property
rights, see Diaz, supra note 13, at 230-33.
70. Gutierrez, supra note 16, at 2. Article 232 stated:
This Fundamental Law may be amended by the Council of Ministers, by affirmative vote
of two-thirds of its members, ratified by the same margin in three successive meetings of
the Council of Ministers and subject to the approval of the President.
Diaz, supra note 13, at 236 n.58 (quoting Ley Fundamental, art. 32, published in Gaceta Oficial, Feb. 7,
1950, at 1.
71. Article 285 of the 1940 Constitution allowed constitutional amendments to be approved by
referendum or by "super-majority" of Congress. CONsTrrucION DE 1940 art. 285. Article 286
provided that major changes of the Constitution could only occur with the approval of a
Constitutional Convention followed by a referendum. CONSTrTUCION DE 1940 art. 286. See also supra
notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
72. Gutierrez, supra note 16, at 2 (quotingJURlSTS, supra note 42, at 87).
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Since the Batista government seldom relied on the 1940 Constitution as
a source of its power, it is open to dispute whether Castro, when he came
to power, was bound by a Constitution suspended seven years before-
hand.73 Because of the questionable status of the 1940 Constitution
when Castro came to power, a future government that decides to apply
pre-Communist law to expropriation claims most likely will apply only
those provisions of the 1940 Constitution reenacted by the Fundamental
Law of 1959.
B. Did the Takings Violate Communist Law?
Cuba's potential post-socialist government could analyze the taking
of private property by the Castro government's application of its own
socialist law. In Poland, where the Communist government expropri-
ated parcels of less than fifty hectares in direct contravention of the
Communist Constitution, 74 most claimants seek either the return of the
property or compensation reflecting its fair value. The Polish court
system has not yet resolved these claims.
75
The Castro government expropriated property pursuant to amend-
ments and statutes enacted between 1959 and 1976. In 1960, the Cuban
Council of Ministers amended Article 24 of the Fundamental Law to
permit the expropriation of property without compensation in cases
where the property owners had committed crimes against the state.76
Moreover, the Agrarian Reform Law of 1959 conformed with the
amended version of Article 24 because the takings were for a public
purpose, 7 7 and procedures for providing compensation had been estab-
lished.78 In addition, the Urban Reform of 1960 established a compensa-
73. Cf id. at 3-7.
74. Gmurzynska, supra note 33, at 38-41.
75. Id. at 50.
76. The Cuban government enacted the Constitutional Reform Law of July 5, 1960, which
amended Article 24 to state: "Confiscation of property is prohibited, but it is authorized in the case
of the property of the tyrant overthrown on December 31, 1958 and his accomplices .... " Diaz,
supra note 13, at 230-31 n. 46 (quoting Ley de Reforma Constitucional,published in Gaceta OficialJuly
5, 1960, at 1).
77. The nationalization of large landholdings was part of a government policy to redistribute
land to rural farmers in an effort to increase agricultural production. Diaz, supra note 13, at 239.
78. Article 31 of the Agrarian Reform Law states:
The indemnification will be paid in negotiable bonds. To that end, a series of bonds of the
Republic of Cuba will be issued in the amounts, terms and conditions that will be set at
the appropriate time. The bonds shall be denominated "Agrarian Reform Bonds" and
will be regarded as government obligations.... The Republic's Budget for each year
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tion program for the owners of expropriated apartment buildings.7 9
However, the Cuban government's failure to fulfill its obligation to
compensate former owners violated its own nationalization laws.
80
In addition, the law authorizing the expropriation of "abandoned"
property may have violated existing constitutional law, since it was
passed to punish those who left Cuba for political reasons and not to
promote any public purpose as required by Article 24.81 In fact, punish-
ing a class of people for certain political beliefs violated Article 33 of the
1940 Constitution, which was reinstated by the 1959 Fundamental
Law.8 2 Even if the reasons for the expropriations were valid, the
abandonment law still failed to pass constitutional muster because it did
not provide a procedure for compensating those individuals deemed to
have abandoned their property.8 3
The Cuban expropriations of 1959, which denied compensation to
former Batista government officials, appear to have complied with the
Fundamental Law and its procedural rules. However, the large-scale
nationalizations authorized by the Agrarian laws of 1959 and 1963 and
by the amendments to the 1959 Fundamental Law passed in 1959 and
1960 appear to have violated the requirement imposed by those laws
that compensation be paid to expropriated property owners.8 4
C. Did the Taking Violate Post-Communist Law?
The third way to recognize the validity of Cuban property claims
under domestic law would require a post-socialist Cuban government to
enact laws that would retroactively apply to the Castro expropriations
shall include the necessary amount to finance the payment of interest, amortization and
expenses of the issuance.
Diaz, supra note 13, at 239 n.78 (quoting Ley de ReformaAgraria, published in Gaceta Oficial, June 3,
1959, at 2).
79. Diaz, supra note 13, at 239 n.79.
80. Id. at 239.
81. Juan C. Consuegra-Barqufn, Cuba's Residential Property Ownership Dilemma: A Human Rights
Issue Under International Law, RUTGERS L. REv. 873, 903-04 (1994) (discussing Law 989 of December
6, 1961).
82. Id. at 904.
83. Id.
84. Even under the more "socialistic" 1976 Constitution, the state has a general obligation to
provide compensation for seized property, Article 59 of the 1976 Constitution provides: "Confisca-
tion of property is only applied as a punishment by the authorities, in the cases and by the methods
determined by law." CONSTrruCION DE 1976 art. 59. See also Consuegra-Barqufn, supra note 81, at
896-97.
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by requiring compensation or restitution for the former owners. Many
post-Communist governments have adopted this approach. The Esto-
nian and Latvian governments both invalidated all laws that national-
ized or expropriated private property between 1940 and 1980.85
In 1989, the Hungarian government passed a law compensating
persons resettled, relocated, or unlawfully convicted during the Commu-
nist period for the costs they incurred as well as for the property they
lost.86 The most aggressive Hungarian compensation laws were passed
in 1991 and 1992 and applied retroactively to most of the expropriations
and nationalizations that occurred during the Communist period.8 7
Similarly, a future Cuban government assuming power could reenact
the 1940 Constitution without any of the amendments or laws passed by
the Castro government. If the Constitution were applied retroactively to
the period covering the Batista and Castro era, then claimants would
have a stronger argument for restitution or maximum compensation
because of the stringent indemnification provision of Article 24. More-
over, as part of its efforts to obtain full value compensation for expropri-
ated claimants, the U.S. government could exert diplomatic and eco-
nomic pressure on a transition Cuban government to recognize the
original property protection provisions of the 1940 Constitution.
IV. LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO RECOVERY
Significant legal barriers confront the expropriated Cuban property
claimant because both international law and the national law of the
expropriating state will determine the availability of remedies. The
strict claimant-eligibility rules of customary international law may
invalidate claims held by the many thousands of Cubans who fled Cuba
after the revolution and later became nationals of other countries.
Accordingly, such claimants may be deemed to have abandoned their
property both under international and Cuban law. But, under interna-
tional law, these claimants may be entitled to some form of compensa-
tion, the value of which depends on the legality of the expropriation,
another tenet of international law. Lastly, many factors will go into
determining the amount of any compensation; for example, U.S. claim-
85. During the period of the 1940s to 1980s, both governments enacted their expropriation
measures. Frances Foster, Post-Soviet Approaches to Restitution: Lessons for Cuba 93, 95 (unpub-
lished paper submitted at Cuba in Transition: Options for Addressing the Challenge of Expropri-
ated Properties, Annual Meeting of the American Bar Ass'n Section on Int'l Law & Practice, Aug. 9,
1994) (on file with Law &Policy in International Business).
86. Simonetti et al., supra note 33, at 65, 74.
87. Id. at 66-69, 88.
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ants will incur income tax liability on compensation received to the
extent that such compensation was initially deducted as a loss in
previous tax years.
A. Claimant Eligibility
A preliminary, but fundamental, issue in determining the rights of
expropriated property claimants is who has standing to assert a claim
for expropriated property. Customary international law has strict rules
governing who may assert claims against states for violations of interna-
tional law: an individual may not bring a claim directly, but may invoke
the protection of her or his home state to remedy alleged infringements
of rights under international law. 88 These principles of international law
will be discussed first. This section will then continue by addressing
domestic laws, which also may impose constraints against claimants who
seek to recover expropriated property. In passing such laws, govern-
ments are constrained both by basic principles of fairness and by
practical policy goals, which seek to limit claims to a number that the
government can feasibly resolve. To accomplish this, some governments
have limited the time period in which claims can be brought.8 9 Other
countries also have adopted restrictions that permit claims to be brought
only if based on property that was expropriated during a certain time
period.90 Another approach has been to prohibit corporations, religious
institutions, and other organizations from asserting property claims.
9 1
More controversially, and possibly in violation of international law, some
governments have prohibited foreign nationals and their own citizens
who live abroad from asserting claims.
92
1. Claimant Eligibility Under International Law
Under customary international law, claimants who were Cuban nation-
als at the time of the expropriation do not have standing to invoke the
88. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1059 (2d ed. 1987).
89. For a discussion of domestic limits on claimant eligibility, see infra Part IV.A.2.
90. See, e.g., Law of the Republic of Estonia on the Principles of Property Reform, art. 6 (June
13, 1991), translated in RESTORATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA: SELECTION
OF LEGAL ACTS 55, 56 (Advig Kiris ed., 1991) [hereinafter Estonian Property Reform Principles].
Under Estonian law, illegal expropriations occurred between June 16, 1940 and June 1, 1981. Id.
Latvian law recognizes expropriations from "the 1940s to 1980s." Republic of Latvia Law on the
Return of Buildings to their Legal Owners 1 (Oct. 30, 1991) (translation obtained from the
Latvian Embassy to the United States) (on file with Law and Policy in International Business).
91. See Simonetti et al., supra note 33, at 66-68 (discussing Hungary's Compensation Laws).
92. For examples of prohibited claims see infra notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
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diplomatic protection of a foreign state. They must pursue their claims
through the Cuban court system because, absent a treaty or agreement
to the contrary, international law provides no redress for individual
claimants against one's own state unless the claim arises from the
state's breach of a fundamental norm of international law.93 Expropria-
tion of property without compensation does not rise to the level of
violation of a peremptory norm. Likewise, a company which has its
primary place of operation in Cuba and/or was incorporated in Cuba
has no standing to invoke the protection of a foreign state.9 4 By contrast,
a company that conducted business in Cuba, but was incorporated in
and had its primary place of operation in another state, may invoke the
diplomatic protection of its home state against Cuba for damages
suffered as a result of any infringement of its rights by the Cuban
government. 95 International tribunals, however, have not decided the
issue of whether shareholders may invoke the protection of their home
state against the foreign state under the laws of which the shareholders'
company was organized.
96
Customary international law permits a state to assert a claim against
another state on behalf of its nationals or citizens when their rights
under international law have been infringed by the respondent state.97
Individuals, however, have no legal capacity to assert claims under
international law against foreign states because only states, and not
93. International law distinguishes between rules of customary international law and peremp-
tory norms. Peremptory norms are fundamental principles (Uus cogens) that include prohibitions
against slavery, piracy, unlawful use of force, and certain basic political and social rights enumer-
ated in the international human rights conventions. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 88, at 1000. When
the domestic state has violated a peremptory norm of international law against one of its nationals,
a foreign state may invoke its diplomatic protection on behalf of the aggrieved individual. Id. at
999-1001, 1019. The foreign state's right of diplomatic protection derives from the obligation of all
states erga omnes (to the world community) not to violate peremptory norms of international law,
because all states suffer injury as a result of such violations. Id. at 1019. By contrast, when an
individual suffers injury as a result of its state's violation of customary international law, but the
violation itself does not rise to the level of a breach of a peremptory norm, a foreign state may not
invoke its diplomatic protection, Id. In the latter case, a state may only assert the claim of an
individual if it has a diplomatic link with the aggrieved party. See Case Concerning the Barcelona
Traction, Light, and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) Second Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5)
[hereinafter Barcelona Traction].
94. See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.CJ. 3.
95. Id. at 37. These legal criteria become more difficult to identify as the ownership,
management and workforces of multinational enterprises become increasingly transnational. See
ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 137-53 (1991).
96. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.CJ. at 48.
97. Id. at 34-35. See also EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
ABROAD 356-57 (1916).
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individuals, are subjects of international law.98 In addition, an individual
has no international legal right to compel his or her home state to assert
a claim against a foreign state for an alleged injury suffered by the
individual in violation of international law;99 the state has discretionary
power in deciding whether to assert a claim on behalf of its nationals.' 0 0
To invoke the diplomatic protection of his or her state, a claimant
must have been a national of the protecting state at the time the claim
arose and continuously until the claim is filed.' O' Therefore, for the U.S.
government to specifically represent injuries suffered by a U.S. national,
it must be able to show in fact both that the claimant presently is a U.S.
national and that the individual seeking compensation was a U.S.
national or citizen at the time the claim arose.
Many Cuban nationals whose property was taken by the Castro
regime fled Cuba and settled in the United States, where they eventu-
ally acquired the status of permanent residents or citizens of the United
States. While their claims arose in Cuba, they seek the protection of the
U.S. government. Such protection could not be granted because expatri-
ates were not U.S. citizens when their claims arose. Moreover, the
Castro regime enacted laws prohibiting Cuban exiles who fled Cuba
after the revolution from asserting property claims in Cuban courts.1
02
98. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 22, at 860; see also Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955
I.CJ. 4, 24 (Apr. 6). The Permanent Court of InternationalJustice best articulated this doctrine:
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its
subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State,
from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels.
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law.
The question, therefore, whether the present dispute originates in an injury to a
private interest, which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes, is
irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a state has taken up a case on behalf of one of its
subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is sole
claimant.
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.2, at 12 (Aug. 30).
99. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 44.
100. Id. The I.CJ. held, inter alia, the state, "retains in this respect a discretionary power the
exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to
the particular case." Id.
101. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 88, at 1068-69 (discussing the positions of the Restatement and
the U.S. Department of State).
102. MESA-LAGO, SOCIALIST CUBA, supra note 16, at 12.
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These exiled Cubans and Cuban-American citizens are trapped in a gray
area of the law where the strict application of the standing rules of
customary international law leaves them with no recourse.
Corporations face different dilemmas. A corporation's right to invoke
diplomatic protection derives from the state under the laws of which the
entity is incorporated and maintains a registered office. '0 3 Indeed, some
states have granted diplomatic protection to companies solely because
their seat of management, or "center of control," was located in the
state's territory.'0 4 Although no absolute test has emerged, most states
require a "genuine connection" between the company and the state the
protection of which it seeks.' 0 5 The International Court of Justice
applied this rule in the Barcelona Traction case.' 0 6 There, the court held
that Belgian shareholders of a company doing business in Spain, but
organized under Canadian law, could not invoke the protection of
Belgium to assert a claim against Spain for allegedly violating the rights
of the Canadian company's Spanish branch. 0 7 The court reasoned that
Barcelona Traction's direct links to Canada, and to no other country,
entitled only the Canadian government to bring a claim on its behalf.' 8
Only the company, not the shareholders, could benefit from any rights
the company possessed under international law.' 0 9 Moreover, although
the Belgian shareholders had suffered an economic loss, none of their
rights as shareholders under Spanish law had been infringed, and
therefore they had no privilege to invoke the protection of the Belgian
government." 0
The court refused to answer the question of whether Belgium would
103. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.CJ. at 42.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The Court held that only Canada, and not the state of the company's shareholders
(Belgium), could assert a claim on behalf of Barcelona Traction because the company had its
headquarters in Canada and it was incorporated under Canadian law. Id.
108. Id. at 35.
109. Id. The I.CJ. held:
[T]he mere fact that damage is sustained by both company and shareholder does not
imply that both are entitled to claim compensation .... Thus whenever a shareholder's
interests are harmed by an act done to the company, it is to the latter that he must look
to institute appropriate action; for although two separate entities may have suffered
from the same wrong, it is only one entity whose rights have been infringed.
Id.
110. Id. at 35, 37.
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have had standing if Barcelona Traction had been organized under
Spanish law, but it recognized in dicta that "a theory has been developed
to the effect that the State of the shareholders has a right of diplomatic
protection when the State whose responsibility is invoked is the national
State of the company.""' Under this theory, foreign shareholders of a
company organized and doing business under the laws of Cuba conceiv-
ably could have standing to invoke the protection of their home states
against the Cuban government for alleged violations of either the rights
of the shareholders or of the company under international law." 
2
To circumvent these standing issues, states may enter agreements
waiving the nationality requirements of the standing rule by allowing
themselves or third party states to bring claims on behalf of injured
aliens. Such negotiated concessions generally take the form of bilateral
agreements or treaties. 1 3 The U.S. government has entered such
agreements, most recently with the government of Albania.' 14 The
Albanian-U.S. agreement allows the U.S. government to assert claims
on behalf of "dual United States-Albanian nationals" if "those nationals
are domiciled in the United States currently or for at least half the
period of time between the taking of their property in Albania and the
date [of] entry into force of the agreement.""..5 The agreement permits
the U.S. government to assert claims on behalf of individuals who did
not become U.S. nationals until after their respective claims arose
against the Albanian government. 1
6
111. Id. at 48. The court refused to give this theory any further consideration.
112. See id. at 49.
113. HENKIN ETAL.,supra note 88, at 1001, 1068-69. Moreover, in 1955 Congress amended the
Italian Claims Act to permit the inclusion of claimants who were not U.S. citizens at the time the
Italian government expropriated their property but who had become U.S. citizens by the time the
U.S. government had agreed to a settlement with the Italian government. See 22 U.S.C. § 1641(c)
(1988). Congress likely would not approve a similar amendment to the Cuban Claims Act because it
may be opposed by the existing certified U.S. claimants, whose share of any future lump sum award
would be reduced if the claimant class were enlarged and the negotiated final award were less than
100%. Every post-World War II U.S. lump sum agreement has been for an amount less than 100% of
the property's adjudicated value. Cf LILLICH & WESTON, supra note 31, at 236-40. For other reasons
why amending the Cuban Claims Act to expand the number of claimants would be problematic, see
generally Robert C. Helander, Creditors'Rights: Claims Against Cuban Confiscated Assets, in INVESTING IN
CUBA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 37, 42 (1994).
114. See Marion Nash (Leich), Contemporag
, 
Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 88 AM.J. INrr'L L. 89, 93-96 (1994) (discussing the Albanian-U.S. agreement of 1993, in which
both countries agreed that Albania would create an Albanian commission to resolve all U.S.
property claims).
115. Id. at 95.
116. Id.
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Similarly, the U.S. and Czechoslovakian governments signed an agree-
ment in 1981 settling all claims held by U.S. citizens against the
Czechoslovakian government." 7 The agreement also allowed those
persons whose property was expropriated by the Czechoslovakian govern-
ment between 1945 and 1948 and who became U.S. citizens by 1948 to
receive a portion of the lump sum settlement." 8 The Department of
State vigorously opposed this deviation from well-settled principles of
international law and feared the provision would create a precedent that
would involve the U.S. government in a whole range of marginal and
new claims.' 9 However, Congress prevailed, and the settlement provi-
sion allocated a portion of the settlement proceeds to U.S. citizens
whose property was taken between 1945 and 1948, even if their claims
previously had been rejected by the FCSC because they were not U.S.
nationals at the time their property was expropriated. 20 Despite pass-
ing the legislation, Congress reaffirmed its support for the traditional
rule of diplomatic espousal by inserting language into the claims act
that this settlement award "does not establish any precedent for future
claims payments." 
' 2i
2. Claimant Eligibility Under Domestic Law
The experiences of former Eastern Bloc countries provide examples
as to how claims based on expropriation have played out in the domestic
context. The Estonian government, for example, has enacted property
laws that permit former citizens, current citizens, and their heirs to
bring claims against the current government for property that was
expropriated by the Communist regime.' 22 Similarly, the Latvian govern-
117. See Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-127, § 6(a)(2)(B), 95
Stat. 1675 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1642 (1988)); see also Vrativlav Pechota, The 1981
U.S.-Czechoslovak Claims Settlement Agreement: An Epilogue to Postwar Nationalization and Expropriation
Disputes, 76 AN,.J. INT'L L. 639, 640 (1982). The U.S.-Czechoslovak agreement settled all claims held
by U.S. citizens against Czechoslovakia for expropriations carried out between 1945 and 1981. Id.
118. Pechota, supra note 117, at 640, 649. The agreement required that the Czechoslovak
government pay a lump sum of US$81.5 million to be distributed to U.S. claimants on apro-rata
basis. The U.S. government agreed to return to Czechoslovakia 18.4 million metric tons of
monetary gold (worth US$250 million) and also agreed to release blocking control over certain
properties. Id. Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, reprinted in S. Rep.
No. 97-211, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1981).
119. Cf Pechota, supra note 117, at 642-44.
120. Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement Act of 1981, 95 Stat. 1676-77 (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. § 1642 ,1988)).
121. Id.
122. Foster, supra note 85, at 93, 96.
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ment permits such claims to be asserted by former owners and their
heirs, regardless of present citizenship.' 23 Latvia also permits domestic
and foreign corporations, governmental entities, and religious institu-
tions to assert claims.' 24 Although Latvian law allows such claims,
Estonia and Lithuania have far more restrictive rules on who may bring
claims.' 25 Estonia prohibits aliens, foreign states, and other foreign legal
entities from bringing claims, for the reason that these foreign entities
can seek redress through inter-state negotiations between their home
state and Estonia.' 26 Such inter-state negotiations often result in lump
sum settlement agreements in which the expropriated foreign claimant
receives a small fraction of the claim's original value.' 27 Lithuania has
adopted even narrower standards by allowing only current citizens and
permanent residents to file claims.
28
Some of the largest post-Communist countries have also restricted
the kinds of claimants eligible for compensation. Although Poland has
yet to approve a law to provide compensation for expropriated property,
some proposed drafts preclude all foreign nationals or foreign business
entities from asserting compensation claims.' 29 These proposed laws
would limit those eligible for compensation to Polish citizens and
residents. 31
The Hungarian compensation laws also restrict who can bring prop-
erty claims. 31 The Hungarian First Compensation Law restricts the
eligible group of claimants to: (1) persons who were Hungarian citizens
at the time the First Compensation Law came into force; (2) persons
123. Id. at 97.
124. For example, Estonian law permits restitution to nonprofit community and religious
organizations. Estonian Property Reform Principles, arts. 7(l), 7(4), 9(l),supra note 90, at 56-58.
Latvia has also allowed claims from former religious groups. Foster, supra note 85, at 98 (citing
Latvian RadioJan. 13, 1994, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,Jan. 21, 1994). The
focus of restitution in the Baltic Republics, however, has been on land and residences. Id. (citing
Frances Foster, Former Soviet Republics' Approaches to Restitution 7 (1994) (unpublished manu-
script on file with Law and Policy in International Business)).
125. See Foster, supra note 85, at 97-98.
126. Id. at 97.
127. See generally LILLICH & WESTON, supra note 31, at 230-38. Lillich and Weston calculated
that by 1975 payments pursuant to lump sum settlements were signed on average twenty years
after the expropriation occurred and provided compensation in a range from 4.5% to 60% of the
adjudicated value of the claims excluding interest. See id. at 20-22, 179, 218 n.54-56.
128. Foster, supra note 85, at 98. The heirs of previous owners must provide documentary proof
of permanent residence or Lithuanian citizenship. Id.
129. Gmurzynska, supra note 33, at 50, 51 n.2.
130. Id. at 51.
131. See Simonetti et al.,supra note 33, at 65-69.
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who were Hungarian citizens at the time of the actionable injury; (3)
persons who were deprived of their Hungarian citizenship; or (4)
non-Hungarian citizens who could claim primary residence in Hungary
on December 31, 1990.132 The law provides compensation only to natural
persons and not to companies or any other organizations. 33 Moreover,
individuals who have had their claims settled by treaty or by any other
agreement with the government may not receive further compensation.'
34
The former Czechoslovakian government, after the "velvet revolu-
tion" in 1989, enacted three major restitution laws that provided
claimants with the option of reacquiring their former properties or
receiving compensation.' 35 The law, however, restricted the eligibility of
former citizens and emigres in obtaining compensation or restitution. 136
For instance, emigres could only file claims for "small" parcels of property,
while resident citizens could file claims for both small and large parcels of
property. 137 Resident citizens could seek restitution of agricultural or forestry
land, whereas former citizens or emigres could not. 
38
The policies of these post-Communist governments to restrict the
class of eligible claimants based on citizenship, nationality, and resi-
dency explicitly discriminates against foreigners who had property
taken without compensation and denies those foreigners any redress in
that country for their claims. International law prohibits a state from
enacting expropriations that purposively apply only to foreign-owned
property. 13 9 Such expropriations discriminate on the basis of national-
ity, violate customary international law, and entitle the expropriated
owner to full value compensation. 
40
132. Id. at 65-66.
133. Id. at 66.
134. Id. When these claimants receive lump sum awards, they are deemed "satisfied" or
compensated and thus are precluded from pursuing their claim any further. See LILUCH & WESTON,
suPRA note 31, at 132.
135. Anna Gelpern, The Law and Politics ofReprivatization in East-Central Europe, 14 U. PA.J. INT'L
Bus. L. 315, 338, 354-58 (1993).
136. Id. at 340-41.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 341 n.95.
139. See supra note II and accompanying text.
140. One scholar summarized the doctrine in this way:
... measures taken in violation of treaty commitments or in pursuit of no public purpose,
or measures discriminatory against the alien, are unlawful under international law. A
subsequent denial of justice also entails the state's responsibility for an international
tort, so that measures which are followed by a denial ofjustice are similar in their effects
to measures unlawful ab inilio.
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By refusing to permit specific groups to file compensation claims,
these governments in effect ratify certain expropriations that occurred
during the Communist period. Moreover, their refusals to recognize the
claims of foreign parties logically can be viewed as discriminatory
takings in violation of international law. In contrast, there is no interna-
tional law violation when a government prohibits only the claims of those
former alien owners who have had their claims settled by lump sum agree-
ment or by any other agreement with the respondent government.'
4 1
To comply with international law, Cuba should broadly define the
group of eligible claimants to include all former owners of Cuban
property (individuals and business entities) at the time of expropriation.
Understandably, such a broad definition of eligible claimants would
result in many thousands of claims against the Cuban government-
imposing a substantial financial burden on Cuba's limited budget. The
Cuban government could reduce this amount by negotiating other
settlement agreements with states where nationals hold substantial
claims. Because past settlement agreements have produced compensa-
tion awards that are generally far less than the full value of the property,
the Cuban government could conceivably follow the precedents of other
nations and adopt a compensation program that, in conjunction with
major economic reforms, would provide satisfactory compensation to
former owners of Cuban property.1
4 2
B. Abandonment
1. International Law of Abandonment
At present, the Cuban government maintains that Cubans and foreign-
A. A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES To FOREIGN INVESTORS 307 (1962). See also IAN BROWN-
LIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 539 (3d ed. 1978) (discriminatory takings are within
the category of those "illegal apart from a failure to provide for compensation .... ); BARRY E.
CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 860 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting Statement of President
Ronald Reagan, 19 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1216-18 (Sept. 9,1983)); Lord McNair, The Seizure of
Property and Enterprises in Indonesia, VI NEDERLANDS TUDSCHRIFT VOOR INTERNATIONAL RECT [NETH.
INT'L LAW REV.] 218, 247-49 (1959).
141. The Cuban government has already signed six lump sum settlement agreements with
developed countries. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
142. The lump sum settlements agreed to by the Cuban government have provided expropri-
ated property claimants with between 10% and 25% of the property's value. See supra notes 29-32
and accompanying text. For instance, the value of Spanish claims totaled nearly $350 million but
were ultimately settled for $40 million. Diaz, supra note 13, at 221 n.14 (citing Cuba to Compensate
Spaniards for Property Seizures, REUTERS TEXTLINE, Feb. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Txtlne File).
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ers who fled after the revolution and failed to return to Cuba abandoned
their property to the Cuban government. 143 But, under international
law, those who fled Cuba after the revolution did not abandon their
claims for expropriated property.
Under international lawforce majeure can be invoked to protect a party
against the consequences of a wrongful act if the act was due to an
irresistible force or to an unforeseen external event beyond the party's
control.1 Such an event must have made it impossible for the party to
act in conformity with its obligation. As a case in point, the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal dealt with the issue of abandonment during the Iranian
revolution. It held that, as a result offorce majeure conditions during the
1979 revolution, U.S. individuals and businesses were justified in leaving
Iran and thereby lost none of their claims for expropriated property. 145
In 1961, the Cuban government enacted a law making it illegal for
Cubans to leave Cuba and penalized those who fled after the revolution
by authorizing state agencies to seize their property. 14 6 Moreover, when
some foreign-owned companies began withdrawing their investments
and employees after the revolution, the Cuban government responded
by directing expropriations against foreign-owned property. 147 Cuban
authorities defended their actions on the grounds that a company's
withdrawal of its investment was tantamount to abandonment and thus
justified the seizure of any related property.148
The Cuban government has argued that because no irresistible force
or external event compelled the departure of any Cuban property
owner, the doctrine offorce majeure does not apply: those who decided to
leave acted on their own volition and therefore abandoned their legal
rights to any Cuban property. 149 Arguably to the contrary, however, the
tumultuous events in Cuba after the 1959 revolution induced an immi-
143. The "abandoned property" law was passed December 5, 1961. Diaz, supra note 13, at 220
(citing Ley [Law] 989,published in Gaceta Oficial, Dec. 6, 1961, at 23,705). Law 989 provided that all
Cubans who left Cuba for the United States and who failed to return within 29 days would have
their property confiscated by the state. Id. at 235 n.64. Moreover, Cubans who had traveled to
destinations other than the United States for periods of 60 days or more were deemed to have
permanently abandoned any claim to their property. Id.
144. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 88, at 538.
145. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 73, 85
(1988). The Iranian government had passed laws similar to Cuba's, which resulted in foreigners
losing their claims to expropriated property if they fled Iran during or after the 1979 revolution.
146. See Diaz, supra note 13, at 235.
147. GORDON, supra note 16, at 96-102; THOMAs, supra note 15, at 475.
148. Interview with Pedro Monreal, Research Associate, Center for American Studies, Havana,
Cuba (Apr. 14, 1995).
149. Id.
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nent fear of political and economic persecution among many Cubans
and foreigners.' 50 In this way, the revolutionary situation in Iran in 1979
was similar to both Castro's violent overthrow of the Cuban government
and his subsequent pacification of the Cuban population. Although the
rulings of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal have no binding effect on
Cuban property claims, they provide a useful analogy for arguing that,
as a result offorce majeure, the Cuban property owners who fled Cuba gave
up none of their rights in expropriated property. 151
In addition to the force majeure doctrine, Cuban and U.S. claimants
could invoke the doctrine of necessity. Necessity serves to protect a party
against the consequences of a wrongful act if the act was deliberately
taken to safeguard "an essential interest" of the party against a "grave
and imminent peril."' 152 The essential interests of individuals include
their right to avoid political persecution. Similarly, an essential interest
of a business entity would be to avoid a state-imposed dissolution or
expropriation of its assets.
Many Cubans fled Cuba after the revolution because Castro began to
enact politically repressive legislation that outlawed most political oppo-
sition groups.' 53 Similarly, many foreign business concerns were justified
by necessity when they began withdrawing employees and assets from
Cuba in anticipation of Castro's expropriation measures. These individu-
als were justified by necessity in leaving Cuba and should not be
penalized for abandoning their property.
154
Moreover, customary international law permits people to flee their
country in times of emergency or when suffering political persecution. 155
Indeed, the International Covenant for Political and Civil Rights sets
forth what has generally become accepted in state practice as a right to
travel under customary international law.' 56 The severe restrictions on
foreign travel imposed by the Castro government against its citizens
appear to have violated customary international law. 15 7 This further
supports the proposition that those who fled Cuba after Castro came to
150. THOMAS, supra note 15, at 450-55.
151. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc., 19 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 85.
152. HENKIN ETAL.,supra note 88, at 540.
153. See THOMAS, supra note 15, at 449-73.
154. Cf id.
155. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 13, 14, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at
71, 74, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
156. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 .L.M. 368, 372.
157. See id.
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power did not abandon their claims for expropriated property under
international law.
2. The Cuban Law of Abandonment
Cuban domestic common and civil law recognize that an occupant of
land acquires certain rights by virtue of continuous possession of that
land.SB This is sometimes known as the doctrine of adverse possession
or of usucapio.'5 9 The 1889 Spanish civil code's definition of adverse
possession distinguished between "ordinary".and "extra-ordinary" ad-
verse possession.' 60 In ordinary adverse possession, a possessor's legal
right in land vested only if he or she had possession of the land for an
uninterrupted period of twenty years and had no knowledge of other
legal title to the land.' 6 1 In extraordinary adverse possession, the
possessor could have knowledge of other legal title to the land so long as
he or she maintained uninterrupted possession for thirty years.'
6 2
In addition to the 1889 Spanish code, the 1988 Cuban Socialist Civil
Code also defines the law of adverse possession.' 63 The Socialist Code
allows no bad faith or extraordinary possession and no adverse posses-
sion against state property. 164 Also, the period for ordinary adverse
possession of urban real property is only five years, and the Code
recognizes no distinction for property owners who currently reside in
Cuba. 165 Furthermore, the Cuban abandonment statute authorized the
government to expropriate property without compensation when the
owner failed to return to Cuba within the period specified in the travel
158. Consuegra-Barqufn,supra note 81, at 905.
159. Adverse possession applied when an individual possessed land for a certain period of time
without having its possession challenged by the property's legal owner. Usucapio is a Roman Law
term that closely corresponds to the common law term of prescription or adverse possession. Under
the Roman Law, to obtain legal title, a possessor needed to prove undisturbed control for two years
for real estate and for one year for movables. J. A. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 142 (1967).
Usucapio differed, however, from the Anglo-common law version insofar as it denied legal title to the
land if the possessor had malafide or knowledge of any specific title to the land. Moreover, the
possessor could never acquire good title to land that was stolen, even if the possessor acquired the
land in good faith. Id.
160. Emilio Cueto, Property Claims of Cuban Nationals (unpublished paper submitted at
Resolution of Property Claims in Cuba's Transition, Cuba in Transition Workshop (Jan. 26, 1995)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 16.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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visa.' 6 6 Because many Cubans failed to return for fear of political
persecution, the onerous travel restrictions of this law could be consid-
ered a restriction of the right to free speech under the 1940 Cuban
Constitution. 1
6 7
Under the current Cuban legal system, the twenty year period for
adverse possession of most real property and the five year period for
possession of urban property likely would have divested most exiled
Cuban property owners of their property for failure to lay claim to it.
Hence, to resist the government's claim to their property, exiled Cubans
must show that they were suffering persecution and were compelled to
leave.
C. The Standard and Amount of Compensation
An appropriate compensation program for a post-Communist country
must accomplish two goals. First, it must ensure equitable compensa-
tion for former property owners under domestic and international law.
Second, a compensation program should not deter foreign investment
and stifle economic growth by destabilizing expectations over the future
disposition of expropriated property. Aside from these goals, U.S.
taxpayers need to understand the tax consequences of receiving compen-
sation for expropriated property.
1. The International Law of Compensation
Under international law, Cuba had a sovereign right to enact the
expropriation measures of the early 1960s, provided it paid the expropri-
ated foreign owners "just" or "appropriate" compensation worth the
166. The abandonment statute stated:
Article 1. The Ministry of the Interior shall have the power to grant exit permits and
reentry permits to persons leaving the country. If the return does not take place within
the period for which the departure has been authorized, the person shall be considered as
having permanently abandoned the country.
Article 2. In the case of the persons covered [in] ... Article 1, all of their property
(personal, real and other), their rights, securities, and valuables of any kind shall be
considered nationalized through confiscation to the benefit of the Cuban State, and will
be assigned to the appropriate government agency.
Ribas v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1347, 1348-49 (1970) (quoting the Cuban Council of Ministers law No.
989, promulgated Dec. 5, 1961).
167. CONSTITUCION DE 1940 art. 52. This could affect adverse possession claims.
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fair value of the property at the time of the taking. 168 The state's right
to take property, however, is contingent on it having a public purpose,
acting in a non-discriminatory manner, and paying adequate, prompt,
and effective compensation. 169 Determining the appropriate amount of
compensation can be quite complicated, but adequate compensation is
usually defined as the fair market value of the property at the time of
taking. . 70 "Prompt" means payment at the time of taking or shortly
thereafter, and "effective" means compensation shall be paid in an
effectively realizable currency or its equivalent.' 71
Most Western states and some international arbitral tribunals have
held that the fair market value of the property reflects its economic or
168. Fair market value usually means full value, which takes into account "going concern
value," if any, and any other generally recognized valuation principles. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 cmt.d (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
THIRD]. In certain specific circumstances, however, a government may be excused from paying "full
value" compensation. See infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Restatement Third
defines "just" compensation to be an amount "equivalent to the value of the property taken."
RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra.
169. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 538-50 (4th ed. 1990). The
"prompt, adequate, and effective" formula was coined by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull in a
1938 letter responding to the Mexican government's nationalization of U.S.-owned agricultural
lands and oil fields. 3 GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655-58 (1942). Today,
the Department of State still espouses the Hull Doctrine as the standard of compensation required
by international law. See U.S. Informs Cuba of Views on Agraian Reform Law, 40 DEP'T ST. BULL. 958
(1959); U.S. Protests Cuban Seizures of Property, 43 DEP'T ST. BULL. 316 (1960). By contrast, some
theorists and certain Latin American countries have asserted that when a state expropriates
foreign-owned property, its only obligation under international law is to pay compensation in an
amount equal to that which would have been paid to nationals of the expropriating state. See, e.g.,
SirJohn Fischer Williams, International Law and the Property ofAliens, 9 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L., B (1928)
(Williams was the British representative on the Permanent Court of Arbitration.). Carlos Calvo,
the eminent Argentinean jurist of the late nineteenth century, advocated the equal treatment
principle as part of the Calvo Doctrine. CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD 80 (1985). Bolivia
maintains this position today. Id. In contrast, Mexico abandoned the equal treatment principle
when it entered into the North American Free Trade Agreement. Compare id. with LESLIE ALAN
GLICK, UNDERSTANDING THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 24-26 (1994) (analyzing the
provision of the NAFTA agreement that guarantees fair market value compensation for expropri-
ated property).
170. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 168, at § 712 cmt.d. See Brice M. Clagett,Just Compensation
in International Law: The Issues Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in 4 THE VALUATION OF
NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 31, 48-90 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1987). But cf.
BROWNLIE, supra note 169, at 543-44 (prompt compensation is often subordinated for other
concerns, such as the economic realities of large payments.). Clagett writes that "adequate" means
"just" ard that both terms mean "compensation must make the expropriated owner whole for the
value he has lost." Clagett, supra, at 31.
171. Clagett,supra note 170, at 31.
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full value, which includes its profitability, net-book value, and good-
will. 172 In the case of an ongoing business where there was no active
market, the property's value would be measured as a going concern.
17 3
The valuation of a going concern measures the discounted cash flow of
the property's future profits. 1 74 Where the state has lawfully expropri-
ated property that is not an ongoing business, other valuation methods
may be more appropriate than the discounted cash flow method. 1
75
Some tribunals and publicists have cited the lost future profits
method as the proper valuation measure for determining the amount of
compensation owed by a state when it expropriates a foreign-owned
business. 176 Most capital-exporting states and their jurists contend that
172. William C. Lieblich, Determining the Economic Value of Expropriated Income-Producing Property in
International Arbitrations, 8 J. INT'L ARB. 59, 61-63 (1991); see, e.g., Lighthouses Arbitration (Fr. v.
Greece), 23 I.L.R. 299, 300-01 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1956); Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. National
Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136, 186 (1963). But cf Davis R. Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement
(Revised), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 176, 177 (1984) (discussing the failure of the Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States to deal adequately with the question of compensation for
expropriation of private property).
173. An active market would measure fair market value by the amount a willing buyer would
pay a willing seller. Starrett Housing Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
112, 201 (1987).
174. World Bank, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, compiled in 2 GENERAL
COUNSEL OF THE WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP., MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARAN-
TEE AGENCY, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 35, 42 (1992)
[hereinafter World Bank Guidelines]. Discounted cash flow means:
... the cash receipts realistically expected from the enterprise in each future year of its
economic life as reasonably projected minus that year's expected cash expenditure, after
discounting this net cash flow for each year by a factor which reflects the time value of
money, expected inflation, and the risk associated with such cash flow under realistic
circumstances. Such discount rate may be measured by examining the rate of return
available in the same market on alternative investments of comparable risk on the basis
of their present value ....
Id. at 42.
175. For instance, some type of liquidation or break-down value should be used, such as
net-book value or replacement costs in cases of movable or immovable property that is not an
ongoing business. See generally John Westberg, Applicable Law, Expropriatoy Takings and Compensation in
Cases ofExpropriation; ICSID and Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Case Law Compared, 8 ICSID REV 1,
19-28 (1993).
176. Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Nor. v. U.S.), I R.I.A.A. 307, 338-39 (The Hague 1922);
Lighthouses Arbitration, 23 Int'l L. Rep. at 300-01; SapphireIntl, 35 Int'l L. Rep. at 186. The lost future
profits method uses the discounted cash flow of net future earnings to calculate the value of a
property. The U.S. government asserts that the lost future profits method is a component of the
adequate compensation standard under international law. Pamela B. Gann, Compensation Standard
for Expropriation, 23 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 615, 618 (1985).
[Vol. 27
RESOLVING PROPERTY CLAIMS INA POST-SOCIALIST CUBA
the lost future profits method (lucrum cessans) is a component of the
traditional international law rule of full value compensation., 77 Other
arbitral tribunals and publicists (including two panels of the Iran-U.S.
claims tribunal) have distinguished between unlawful and lawful takings
by holding that full value compensation-that is, lost future profits-is
only appropriate in cases of an unlawful government taking.1 78 This view
rejects the full value standard or lost future profits method as inappro-
priate in cases of lawful takings.' 79 Instead, the tribunals have held that
a lawful taking requires a state to pay an amount of compensation that
reflects actual loss (damnum emergens), which would be the property's
net-book value, replacement costs, goodwill, and commercial prospects
(its capability to earn profits but not its estimated future profits). 8 °
177. See Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 223, 236-37
(1987) (Westernjurists holding that "full compensation" standard of Iran-U.S. FCN Treaty was the
same standard as required by international law). Cf WHITE, supra note 13, at 15 (distinguishing lost
profits between the time of expropriation and the time of compensation from lost future profits).
178. Most modern analysis of expropriation case law begins with the 1928 Chorzow Factory
case, in which the Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.IJ.) ruled that Poland's
nationalization of a German nitrate factory in Upper Silesia violated the 1922 Geneva Protocols,
which prohibited certain Polish expropriations of German-owned property. Factor), at Chorzow
(Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47, 63 (Sept. 13). The P.C.IJ. distinguished between
the remedies required for unlawful and lawful expropriations. Unlawful expropriations required
restitutio integrum, but if restitution was impracticable, the deprived owner was entitled to compensa-
tion that reflected the property's lost future profits. Lawful expropriations, though, required only
compensation that reflected "the just price of what was expropriated" measured as the "value of
the undertaking" at the time of the taking plus interest until date of payment. Id. at 47; in obiter
dictum in I.N.A. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373, 385, 391 (1985);
Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. (1987), reprinted in 27
LL.M. 1314, 1361 (1988). For a discussion of unlawful government takings, see infra notes 182-86
and accompanying text.
179. A lawful taking would occur when the government had a public purpose and violated no
peremptory norms of international law. See Derek W. Bowett, State Contracts with Aliens Under
International Law, 1988 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 59. Bowett cites the Chorzow Factory case for the
proposition that a lawful expropriation requires compensation that reflects a fair value of the
property but not its lost future profits. Id. at 59-60. Moreover, he cites the Chorzow Factory case for
the rule that a lawful expropriation requires compensation providing for a valuation of the property
at the time of the taking plus interest, whereas in an unlawful taking compensation must include
interest until the date of judgment plus any increase in the value of the property from the date of
expropriation until the date of judgment. Id. at 67-68; see also, Charles Chatterjee, The Use of the
Discounted Cash Flow Method in the Assessment of Compensation, 10J. INT'L ARB., No. 4, at 19, 21 (1993). Cf
Lieblich, supra note 172, at 68-72 (Lieblich criticizes Bowett's view by arguing that a property's
contractual rights and goodwill do reflect its discounted cash flow of future profits, and therefore
there is no distinction between the actual loss suffered by an expropriated owner and the loss of
future profits.).
180. Bowett, supra note 179, at 70-72.
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Lost future profits should not be compensated unless the state has
committed an unlawful expropriation.
81
An unlawful expropriation occurs when a state takes property in
violation of a fundamental norm of international law, regardless of
whether the state pays compensation.' 82 For example, a state may not
expropriate property in breach of an international agreement nor can a
state undertake an expropriation that is directed against racial or
religious groups or foreigners. 83 Where the state's expropriation is
unlawful, the expropriated foreign investor has the right to restitution
in kind (return of the property).' 4 If returning the property in its full
value is impracticable, international arbitral tribunals have held that
the state must pay compensation in an amount that would make the
former owner whole again. 185 Such compensation would include both
any increase in the value of the property between the date of the taking
and the date on which compensation is paid and any lost future
profits.1
86
In the case of Cuba, there was no international or bilateral agreement
prohibiting the Cuban government from taking private property. U.S.
claimants, however, have asserted that the expropriations were unlaw-
ful because they were directed against foreigners (U.S. entities in
particular). 8 7 Thus, they reason that they are entitled to have their
181. Id. at 67.
182. These types of unlawful government takings are known asperse unlawful takings because
they are unlawful under any circumstance, regardless ofwhether compensation has been paid. See
BROWNLIE, supra note 169, at 537-38.
183. Id. at 543. Unlawful per se takings also include the taking of assets of international
organizations, takings that are part of crimes against humanity or genocide, and takings of
diplomatic state property. Id. at 538.
184. See Factory at Chorzow, 1928 P.C.IJ. (ser.A) No. 17 at 47.
185. The P.C.IJ. wrote in Factor, at Chorzow:
[R]eparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that [illegal] act
had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear.
Id. at 47; see also Bowett, supra note 179, at 59-60.
186. Factory at Chorzow, 1928 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 17 at 48. Note that compensation is based on
the firm's value not at the time of expropriation but at the time of the award. See Bowett, supra note 179,
at 69. Moreover, lost future profits would include the discounted cash flow of estimated future
earnings. See World Bank Guidelines, supra note 174, at 42.
187. See, e.g., Roger D. Chesley, Comments and Observations ofan Owner of Property in Cuba,
Address Before the Cuba in Transition Conference in Washington D.C. (Jan. 26, 1995) at 9 (on file
with Law and Policy in International Business).
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property returned.' 8 8 Yet, although the July 1960 nationalizations were
directed against all U.S.-owned property, the government's policy was
motivated not only by a political animosity against the United States;
the government's desire to restructure and gain control of its economy
through the adoption of socialist economic principles was also a major
stimulus. 8 9 Moreover, the Cuban government has argued that the July
1960 nationalizations of U.S. property were not necessarily discrimina-
tory against U.S. entities because they were part of a larger nationaliza-
tion plan that included the nationalizations of September-October 1960
that applied to all foreign-owned property and to much Cuban-owned
property as well.' 90 Since the government's actions were motivated
substantially by its alternative economic philosophy and not primarily by
discrimination against foreigners, the expropriations could not be de-
fined as discriminatory.
Even though the nationalizations violated no peremptory norms of
international law, the Cuban government still was required by interna-
tional law to pay adequate, effective, and prompt compensation to
expropriated investors. Under this formula, the amount of compensa-
tion should reflect the property's fair market value at the time of
expropriation. Moreover, the government should have paid compensa-
tion at a time not too long after the taking of property and in the form of
convertible cash or bonds. The 1959 Agrarian Reform Law conditioned
all government takings of property on the payment of compensation in
the form of government bonds valued in pesos.' 9 ' The statute's compen-
sation provisions were never enforced and were later superseded by the
nationalization laws enacted between 1960 and 1962.192 Since Cuba
failed to pay any compensation for its expropriations, it violated custom-
ary international law and thus must pay compensation that reflects the
property's value at the time of expropriation, including interest.
Therefore, even though Cuba violated international law by failing to
pay adequate compensation, the expropriations may not be per se unlaw-
ful because the property takings violated no peremptory norms of
international law.' 93 Thus, any future Cuban government only owes
188. See id.
189. The Cuban government also claims that the nationalizations of U.S. property were in
retaliation against the U.S. government for its reduction of the Cuban.sugar quota. Seesupra notes
20-24 and accompanying text.
190. Interview with Pedro Monreal (Jan. 27, 1995).
191. See GoRDoN, supra note 16, at 75-76.
192. Id. at 101-06.
193. The expropriations violated no treaties or bilateral agreements and were not directed
specifically against racial groups or foreigners. See generally THOMAS, supra note 15, at 422-43.
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compensation for the value of the property at the time of taking,
including interest to the date of the award, but has no obligation to
return the property to the original investor or to pay for any increased
value of the property since the taking.
In addition, some developing states and publicists have recognized a
"social reform" exception to the rule that a government must pay full
value compensation.' 94 The "social reform" exception applies to a
developing country trying to gain control over a vital sector of its
economy. In such a case, the objectives of the expropriation and the
state's ability to pay would be important criteria in determining the
amount of compensation owed.' 95 The United States and other devel-
oped states reject this view by arguing that international state practice
has never uniformly accepted the existence of a social reform exception
to compensation in international law.' 96 Moreover, developed states cite
General Assembly Resolution 1803, reflecting existing customary inter-
national law, that requires in cases of nationalization or expropriation
that "the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, ... in accor-
dance with international law."'
19 7
The Cuban government has argued that its expropriations were part
of a large-scale nationalization program that applied in a non-
discriminatory manner to whole sectors of certain industries. After
1959, the Castro regime certainly had enacted programs to restructure
194. See Karl Meesen, Domestic Law Concepts in International Expropriation Law, in 4 THE
VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 191 (R. B. Lillich ed., 1987). Most
developing states cite General Assembly Resolution 3281, the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States (CERDS), which was adopted in 1974 by a vote 120 to 6 with 10 abstentions (the
U.S., U.K., and Federal Republic of Germany voted against). CERDS states inter alia that: "No
State shall be compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign investment" and that every
state shall have the right to "nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property,...
taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances the State considers
pertinent." Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). The Cuban government has used the language
in CERDS tojustify its refusal to pay compensation to U.S. investors. Olga Miranda, Cuba Has Met
Its Nationalization Obligations Punctually, Address Before the Cuba in Transition Conference in
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 26, 1995).
195. M. SORNARAJAH, THE PURSUIT OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY 189-95 (1986). For instance, a
poor country with few hard currency reserves would be expected to pay only partial compensation
with payments extended over a period of time. Id.
196. Meesen, supra note 194, at 157, 165-67.
197. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N.
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223,225 (1963).
It was approved 87 to 2 (France and South Africa voting no). Of course, its language requiring
"appropriate compensation ... in accordance with international law" has been interpreted by some
scholars as requiring less than full-value compensation.
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and reform whole sectors of its economy.198 If a social reform exception
to the compensation rule exists, there would be no more fertile area of
case law than the property claims arising from the Cuban revolution.
2. The Compensation Laws of Post-Socialist States
The Baltic states have made compensation available in a number of
forms. The most prominent of these are restitution, substitutional
restitution, and compensation. The preferred method for reprivatiza-
tion in the Baltic States is restitution, which entitles the claimant to the
return of the actual property expropriated.' 99 Certain types of property,
however, have been excluded from restitution, often according to size,
use, and alienation.
200
The Baltic states also provide substitutional restitution that furnishes
former owners with replacement property of equivalent value to the
expropriated property.20 1 Substitutional restitution usually occurs where
the original property has changed its form, no longer retains its original
value, or its return has been forbidden by law.20 2 Such replacement
property is subject to the same restrictions on use, size, and transfer as
the actual returned property.
20 3
Generally, compensation falls into two main categories: monetary
restitution and voucher restitution. 20 4 Baltic state statutes provide that
monetary compensation be made in lump sum payments that reflect the
actual value of the property at the time of nationalization. 20 5 The
Estonian government provides compensation that reflects the value of
the property at the time of the taking but does not include the present
value of estimated future profits.2 0 6 Where it is impossible to calculate
an actual value, the Estonian parliament determines compensation by
statute. To satisfy claimants, Estonia has created a compensation fund
198. See, e.g., supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
199. Foster, supra note 85, at 100.
200. Id. In Latvia, agricultural land that is in productive use or property with environmental,
historical, or educational value is excluded. See id. (quoting WORLD BANK, LATVIA: THE TRANSmON
TO A MARKET ECONOMY 93 (1993)). Lithuania limits restitution claims for agricultural plots to no
more than 50 hectares, and it requires such plots be used solely for agricultural production. Id.
201. Id. at 100-01.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See generally Simonetti et al., supra note 33, at 67-72 (discussing Hungary's calculation of
actual damages and system of voucher compensation).
205. Foster, supra note 85, at 101.
206. Id.
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financed by allocating fifty percent of all revenue derived from privatiza-
tion sales of state-owned property.
2 0 7
In Hungary, the government compensates former owners by issuing
vouchers. The Compensation Law states that all claimants who have
claims valued up to HUF 200,000 are entitled to full compensation. 20 8 If
the claim is valued between HUF 200,000 and HUF 300,000, the
government must pay an additional fifty percent of the amount exceed-
ing HJF 200,000.2"9 For claims ranging between HUF 300,000 and HUF
500,000, the government must pay at least HUF 250,000 plus an
additional thirty percent of the damages exceeding HUF 300,000.210
The maximum amount of compensation that can be received by each
former owner for each piece of property is HUF 5,000,000 (approxi-
mately US$50,000 in 1994).211
Moreover, the Compensation Law supplies different levels of compen-
sation depending on whether the property is real, commercial, or
agricultural. For instance, compensation for real property varies from
HUF 200 to HUF 2000 per square meter, while compensation for
commercial property varies from HUF 150,000 to HUF 5,000,000,212 and
compensation for agricultural property is based on its profitability.
21 3
The Hungarian law stipulates that vouchers or "coupons" take the
form of interest-bearing transferrable securities that can be traded on
the Budapest Stock Exchange but cannot be exchanged for cash.2 14 The
vouchers earn interest at the rate of seventy-five percent of the central
bank's prime rate." 5 Compensation vouchers initially were used to
purchase state-owned assets, agricultural land, government apart-
ments, or to trade as securities.2 6 The government has since expanded
the private market for vouchers so that they can be used in a number of
other transactions.
2 17
207. Id. at 101-02.
208. Simonetti et al., supra note 33, at 68.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. Those who receive compensation vouchers (considered Primary Voucher Holders) may
purchase agricultural property through a system of auctions, if they commit to cultivate the lands
rather than sell them. Id. at 72.
214. Id. at 69.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 69-72.
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Germany adopted a policy that made restitution the preferred rem-
edy and compensation a less popular alternative. Claimants who wanted
their property returned could delay any future disposition of the prop-
erty until all pending claims were resolved.2" 8 Restitution claimants
were given priority while compensation claimants had their claims
deferred until all restitution claims had been settled. Moreover, a
successful compensation claimant could only hope to receive payment
from a yet-to-be-established government fund.2 9 Most former owners
of property in Eastern Germany therefore filed restitution claims,
thereby preventing any disposition of claimed property. 220 The more
than one million claims filed for East German property22 1 served as a
deterrent to investment and stifled economic growth in Eastern Ger-
222many.
The Eastern German experience serves as an example to Cuba. Cuba
should prohibit restitution claims for certain large-scale industrial and
commercial property because such claims would deter foreign commer-
cial investment by producing prolonged ambiguity over property owner-
ship. Moreover, lacking sufficient hard currency and cash resources,
Cuba should limit monetary compensation and instead offer coupon
vouchers to former owners. This would facilitate commercial restructur-
ing and privatization. Equally important, Cuba's limited resources
would be preserved for investment in industrial modernization instead
of being squandered in large compensation settlements for outstanding
claims.
In other words, Cuba should make voucher compensation the rule and
restitution the exception. In addition, Cuba would benefit by granting
itself the kind of flexibility that Estonia did by "reserv[ing] the right
with respect to all restitution claims for all types of property to grant
compensation rather than restitution of property being claimed., 223 It
appears that Cuba has no obligation to make restitution-only compen-
sation-if the expropriations themselves are held not to be per se
218. Paul Dodds, Restitution Claims in Eastern Germany: An Experience to Avoid 125, 131,
132 (unpublished paper submitted at Cuba in Transition: Options for Addressing the Challenge of
Expropriated Properties, Annual Meeting of the American Bar Ass'n Section of Int'l Law &
Practice, Aug. 9, 1994).
219. Id. at 131.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 127.
222. Id. at 132.
223. Foster, supra note 85, at 115 (quoting WORLD BANK, ESTONIA: THE TRANSFORMATION TO A
MARKET ECONOMY 101 (1993)).
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violations of international law. Some former owners of Cuban property
will find compensation hard to accept, particularly if Cuba adopts other
methods of compensation like paying expropriated investors with govern-
ment bonds (Nicaragua has used this approach 224) or issuing certificates
that entitle the bearers to acquire shares in state-owned corporations
(as was done in Poland225).
3. A Cuban Program of Compensation
Because the Cuban government is near bankruptcy and the country's
economy is so poor, doubt naturally arises as to whether it would ever be
able to generate the revenues necessary to compensate expropriated
investors. Admittedly, the U.S. trade embargo, communist economic
policies, and substantial reductions in Russian subsidies have resulted in
much economic deprivation. However, Cuba possesses the necessary
human infrastructure and natural resources to attract quality foreign
investment. Most Cubans have access to basic education and health
care, 2 2 6 and many thousands of Cubans are trained in foreign languages,
the advanced sciences, and mathematics.2 2 7 In addition, Cuba possesses
great potential for tourism and vast energy resources.2 2 8 If the United
States lifts its trade embargo and Cuba enacts economic and legal
reforms, Cuba would become eligible for loans and aid from the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund.2 2 9 This would attract private
224. John Otis, Property Disputes Still Tear at Nicaragua, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1994, at A7;
Nicaragua Guarantees Property Rights, REUTERS LIMITED, Nov. 22, 1994, available in NEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File.
225. Gmurzynska, supra note 33, at 51.
226. See Jorge I. Dominguez, Cuban Politics Before and After the 1991 Communist Party Congress, in
CUBA AT A CROSSROADS 1, 11-12 (Jorge F. Perez-Lopez ed., 1994) (reporting poll on Cubans'
satisfaction with health and education services); see also Sergio Diaz-Briquets & Jorge F. Perez-
Lopez, Cuba's Labor Adjustment Policies During the Special Period, in CUBA AT A CROSSROADS 118, 118-21
(Jorge F. Perez-Lopez ed., 1994) (discussing the government's committment to educate and train
its labor force);Julie Feinsilver, Cuban Biotechnology, in CUBA AT A CROSSROADS 167, 167-89 (Jorge F.
Perez-Lopez ed., 1994) (describing Cuba's advances in biotechnology).
227. Feinsilver, supra note 226, at 172-82 (discussing competition among major pharmaceuti-
cal companies for vaccines developed by Cuban scientists).
228. See Archibald R.M. Ritter, Cuba's Economic Strategy: Alternative Futures, in CUBA AT A
CROSSROADS 67, 72-73 (Jorge F. Perez-Lopez ed., 1994) (discussing tourism and nickel potential);
see generally Maria Delores Espino, Tourism in Cuba: A Development Strategy for the 1990s, in CUBA AT A
CROSSROADS 147 (Jorge F. Perez-Lopez ed., 1994); see also Suzanne McGee & Mark Heinzl, Cuba's
Rosier Export Prospects Could Hurt Sugar, Metal Prices, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1995, at C 1, C 14 (noting that
Cuba could become a major exporter of cobalt and nickel if it could attract more foreign investment
and economic assistance).
229. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba's Economic Strategiesfor Confronting the Crisis, in CUBA, AFTER THE
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direct investment and stimulate the economy to such an extent that the
government would be able to finance compensation payments by securi-
tizing its debt on international markets.
In recent years, the Cuban government has abandoned its strict
adherence to socialist economic philosophy by deregulating parts of the
Cuban economy. 230 In 1982, foreign investors were allowed to take a
forty-nine percent stake in certain joint ventures with the Cuban
government, but bureaucratic obstacles and restrictions deterred most
foreign investors until the early 1990s. At that time, the Fourth Party
Congress implemented further economic reforms, eliminating many
governmental obstacles and allowing foreigners to own majority shares
in enterprises designated as a priority by the government.2 3 ' In 1992, the
government granted certain exemptions on profit taxes for designated
industries, the freedom to hire foreign executives, and the free repatria-
tion of profits and of the salaries of foreign workers who work in these
industries. 232 More recently, in December 1994, the Cuban government
privatized some consumer goods businesses in order to develop product
233markets and to alleviate severe shortages . Among these, agricultural
markets have been liberalized by allowing farmers to sell surplus
produce at the market price once their pre-determined quotas have
been delivered to the state.23 4
These reforms belie the plight of the Cuban economy. 235 Notwithstand-
ing its efforts to diversify its economic base, Cuba relies on sugar exports
to earn over ninety percent of its hard currency. 236 Moreover, because of
COLD WAR 201 (Carmelo Mesa-Lago ed., 1993) [hereinafter Mesa-Lago, Cuba's Strategies]. It must
be noted, however, that Cuba's hard currency debt to developed countries other than the United
States is substantial and is in default. Id. Between 1984 and 1990, Cuba's hard currency debt with
developed countries more than doubled as it reached $7.3 billion. Id. More significantly, Cuba
ceased all debt payments in 1986, thus cutting itself off from any new loans or credits. Id. Before
Cuba can qualify for assistance from the IMF or World Bank, it must resume payments on its
current debt.
230. See id. at 201-03. See also CARMELO MESA-LAGO, ARE EcONOMIc REFORMS PROPELLING CUBA
TO THE MARKET? I1, 13-16 (1994) [herein after MESA-LAGo, ECONOMIC REFORMS].
23 1. Perez-Lopez, supra note 4, at 195-98; see also Mesa-Lago, Cuba's Strategies, supra note 229, at
200-03. Priority industries include tourism, which accounts for half of all foreign investment,
mining for nickel, and refining Russian oil for reexport. Id. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying
text for discussion ofempresas mixtras.
232. Mesa-Lago, Cuba's Strategies, supra note 229, at 202.
233. Cuba Implements Limited Economic Reforms, FREE-MARKET CUBA BUSINESS JOURNAL, Spring
1995, at 2 (Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge ed.).
234. Id.
235. MESA-LAGO, ECONOMIC REFORMS, supra note 230, at 4-8.
236. Id. The Cuban sugar harvest, however, has plummeted in recent years. In 1993, the
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the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance, 237 foreign investment and economic growth fell substantially
between 1989 and 1993.238 Although foreign investment increased dra-
matically in 1994, stagnation best describes the Cuban economy.
2 3 9
Moreover, Cuba still has one of the highest political risk ratings of any
country.
2 4 0
4. The Tax Consequences of Compensating Expropriated Claimants
Claimants who are U.S. taxpayers deducted their losses suffered as a
result of the Cuban expropriations.2 41 Generally, expropriation losses
are treated as net-operating losses under Section 165 of the Internal
Revenue Code.24 2 Individuals and corporations may deduct losses sus-
tained during the taxable year for which there was no compensation by
insurance or other reimbursement. 4 3 With respect to individuals, 4 4
these deductions are restricted to: (1) losses incurred in a trade or
business, (2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit,
and (3) casualty or theft losses unconnected with a trade or business.2 45
harvest fell to a historic low of four million tons. Pascal Fletcher, Cuba Impatient Over Russian
Sugar-for-Oil Deal, FIN. TIMES, April 6, 1995, at 39. The 1995 harvest is expected to be less. Id.
237. This Council was the group of Communist countries led by the former Soviet Union that
had created a preferential trading bloc among its members. After the revolutions in Eastern Europe
and the demise of the Soviet Union, this trading bloc collapsed. MESA-LAGO, ECONOMIC REFORMS,
supra note 230, at 1-6.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 9.
240. See Mesa-Lago, Cuba's Strategies, supra note 229, at 202 n.12 (Cuba is a "problem locale" in
terms of investment safety.).
241. For example, General Electric would have been eligible to take loss deductions in an
amount of nearly $2.9 million, which was the amount of their certified claims for expropriated
property against the Cuban government. Documents reviewed by author, Feb., 1995 (on file with
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, Washington D.C.). The Coca Cola Co. would have
been eligible to take loss deductions in an amount of $27,526,239.
242. Wolfe & White, supra note 2, at 594-96.
243. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1994). See Treas. Reg. 1.871-1(a) (1994) (allowing U.S. resident aliens
who have not obtained U.S. citizenship to take deductions for losses incurred under § 165).
244. The restrictions of § 16 5(c) do not apply to corporations, presumably because all
corporate transactions arise as part of a trade or business. In some instances, however, corporations
will be denied deductions on the grounds that the property for which the expense or depreciation
occurred was held for the personal convenience of the corporation's shareholders and not for
business purposes. Greenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947, 956 (8th Cir. 1956).
245. I.R.C. § 165(c) (1994). Casualty losses result from shipwreck, storm, or fire. The
confiscation of the taxpayer's non-business property will not be considered a casualty loss for
purposes of deducting an expropriation loss, unless it results from an accidental event or from theft.
Moreover, the I.R.S. has ruled that an uncompensated expropriation of non-business property does
[Vol. 27
RESOLVING PROPERTY CLAIMS IN A POST-SOCIALIST CUBA
Moreover, to qualify for loss deductions associated with a trade or
business or in pursuit of profits, the taxpayer must show that he or she
had a good faith expectation of profit from the business or investment
enterprise that produced the loss246 and that there was a likelihood that
profits would have been taxable by the U.S. government.
24 7
The U.S. tax code treats U.S. citizens and resident aliens differently
than it treats non-resident aliens. Non-resident aliens may only take
deductions to the extent that such losses are connected with the
production of income subject to U.S. income tax.24 8 If the income is not
connected with a U.S. trade or business, the taxpayer may deduct the
loss of its property if the loss occurred while the taxpayer was a U.S.
resident.2 4 9 Therefore, Cuban citizens who fled Cuba after the revolu-
tion could not take this deduction if their Cuban property had no
U.S.-connected trade or income and was expropriated before they left
Cuba. On the other hand, a Cuban citizen who arrived in the United
States before his or her property was expropriated could take the
deduction because revenue earned from such property after arriving in
the United States would have been subject to U.S. income tax.250
not qualify the taxpayer for a casualty or theft deduction under § 165(c). Therefore, if a taxpayer
had non-business property expropriated, the loss would not qualify for a deduction against ordinary
income. Wolfe & White, supra note 2, at 596-97.
246. Mercer v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1967).
247. Rev. Rul. 80-17, 1980-1 C.B. 46.
248. I.R.C. § 873(a) (1994).
249. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,922 (Aug. 30 1968), available in Westlaw, FTX-GCM Database. The
U.S. Tax Court has held that the sole issue becomes at what point does the taxpayer incur loss of its
property. Ribas, 54 T.C. at 1348-49. This is solely a factual issue that depends on the "practicality of
ownership and control, rather than simply on the retention of legal title," and other factors,
including the intent of the taxpayer, will be considered. d. at 1349. In Ribas, a Cuban citizen fled
Cuba for the United States on December 31, 1961, leaving all of his business property under the
supervision of an employee. The Cuban abandonment statute provided that if he did not return to
Cuba within the 29 day period of his exit visa, his property would be classified as abandoned and
thereby nationalized by the government. Id. The Cuban citizen failed to return within 29 days and
thereby became a U.S. resident alien retroactive to December 31, 1961. Id. The I.R.S. contended
that he should not be allowed to deduct the property's loss for the years 1964-1967 for two reasons:
(1) the Cuban abandonment statute provided that a Cuban citizen's failure to return within 29 days
meant that his property was abandoned on the date ofdeparture, which occurred before he arrived
in the U.S.; and (2) on the date of departure his property was not subject to U.S. tax. Not agreeing
with the I.R.S., the Court held that, notwithstanding the language of the Cuban statute, because
the taxpayer still retained control of his Cuban property after he had become a U.S. resident, any
income he would have earned on his Cuban property would have been subject to U.S. tax. Id. at
1350. Therefore, the expropriation of the property after the 29 day period was fully deductible. Id.
at 1351.
250. Sabas v. Comm'r, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 578, 579 (1973) (holding that loss of value of
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The I.R.S. allows U.S. taxpayers to deduct losses caused by a foreign
government's expropriation of their property.2 5" ' The I.R.S. defines
"foreign expropriation loss" as the "sum of the losses sustained by
reason of the expropriation, intervention, seizure, or similar taking of
property by the government of any foreign country, any political subdivi-
sion thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of the foregoing." 252 An
act of expropriation or confiscation occurs when there is a deprivation of
property ownership or of "the normal attributes of ownership" constitut-
253ing a recognized or identifiable event.
If U.S. claimants are eventually provided compensation under the
domestic laws of a post-socialist Cuba or under an international agree-
ment between the Cuban and U.S. governments, claimants who previ-
ously deducted the loss would owe income tax for the amount that
qualified as a loss deduction in previous tax years. A basic principle of
U.S. tax law holds that the return or recovery of property that was once
the subject of an income tax deduction must be treated as income in the
year of its recovery. 254 For instance, if a U.S. taxpayer owned a manufac-
turing plant in Cuba with a cost basis of $200,000, and it was expropri-
ated by the Cuban government, the taxpayer could deduct his or her
$200,000 loss against ordinary income and thereby obtain a tax savings.
The value of such a deduction for a taxpayer in the thirty percent tax
bracket would be $60,000. If the taxpayer received $200,000 in compen-
sation in a future year, and assuming there were no alterations to the
tax code, he or she would owe income tax on the compensation received
in an amount of $60,000.
Moreover, the I.R.S. will impose the tax rate on the compensation
that is in effect during the year in which the recovered property or
compensation is recognized as income. 255 During the 1960s, U.S. corpo-
securities in Cuban companies that were expropriated before taxpayer became U.S. resident did
not entitle taxpayer to deductions under U.S. tax code, even though taxpayer still retained control
of worthless securities after becoming U.S. resident). To establish a right to an expropriation loss
deduction, petitioner must prove that the loss occurred after the time he or she became a U.S.
resident alien. Id.
251. Rev. Rul. 62-197, 1962-2 I.R.B. 66, clarified by Rev. Rul. 64-149, 1964-1 I.R.B. 233. To
qualify for the deduction, the taxpayer must show that he or she was deprived of the ownership of
his or her property and that there was little or no chance of recovery. Id.
252. See Whyte v. Comm'r, 852 F.2d 306, 308 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing I.R.C. § 172(k)).
253. Rev. Rul. 62-197.
254. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 298 (1946). This rule is limited
by the "tax benefit rule," which permits exclusion of the recovered property as income so long as its
initial use as a deduction provided no tax savings. I.R.C. § 111 (1994); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1
(1994).
255. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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rate tax rates were generally in excess of fifty percent, and therefore a
corporate claimant taking a deduction for an expropriation loss would
have received a tax value in excess of fifty percent of the value of the
property lost. 256 In the 1990s, because corporate tax rates have been
dramatically reduced to not more than thirty-five percent, corporate
claimants that receive compensation for expropriation losses will be
taxed at a far lower rate than the rate at which they took their loss
deductions in the 1960s.257
D. Privatization Agency's Practices and Procedures
Privatization agencies have the primary objective of facilitating a
country's transition to a market economy. An important element of this
transition is the resolution of conflicting property claims for expropri-
ated property. Cuba should enact laws establishing procedures allowing
property claimants to seek restitution or compensation. Some privatiza-
tion agencies adjudicate claims, while others merely maintain records
eventually used in a civil court proceeding.
1. Claims Procedures.
Most post-Communist countries have established a government agency
with the authority to review compensation claims.2 5 In Germany, the
Treuhandanstalt has the primary responsibility for resolving claims for
expropriated property in Eastern Germany and for deciding issues of
restitution and compensation. 259 The Treuhandanstalt has authorized
commissions or panels to adjudicate claims for East German property.
German law permits claimants to appeal commission rulings to the
256. In 1961, the U.S. corporate income tax rate consisted of a normal tax rate of 30% on
taxable income and a surtax of 22% on taxable income in excess of $25,000. Revenue Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 121, reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS, BEGINNING 1961, at 201-02 (1966). In
1964, the corporate income tax rate was reduced to 22% on taxable income, but the surtax was
increased to 26% on taxable income in excess of $25,000. BORIS I. BrITKER &JAMES S. EUSTACE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA'TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 2.20, 47-48 (2d. ed. 1966).
257. In 1995, U.S. corporations generally pay 15% on the first $50,000 of income; for all income
in excess of $50,000, but not exceeding $75,000, a 25% maginal rate is imposed; for all income in
excess of $75,000, but not exceeding $10 million, a 34% marginal rate is imposed; and for all income
in excess of $ 10 million, a 35% marginal rate is imposed. I.R.C. § 11 (1994).
258. See, e.g.,Judy Dempsey, Contenders Lay Claim to the Title: The Problems ofDeciding Ownership of
ConfiscatedEast German Property, FIN. TIMEs,Jan. 27, 1993, at 19 (discussing the Grundbucharchiv, the
East German land registry, and its role in assessing over half a million claims for confiscated
property).
259. See Dodds, supra note 218, at 127.
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German courts.2 6 ° In Poland, because no privatization agency exists,
claimants seek redress directly through the court system. 261 The Hungar-
ian government has established a National Compensation Office that
supervises its local offices in various regions of the country.26 2 Generally,
property claims are filed with the local office of the jurisdiction that
covers the property claimed.26 3 Decisions made by local offices may be
appealed to the National Office, the decisions of which in turn can be
appealed to a civil court.26 4
Unlike most post-socialist states where a government agency receives
restitution or compensation claims, claimants of the Czech and Slovak
Republics must assert claims directly against the person or entity
currently in possession of the property.265 The Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics have no administrative agencies to review property claims. 266 Expro-
priated owners must serve written notice on the current holders of the
property. 267 If the current holder of the property refuses to return it
within a certain time period, the claimant then must file suit in a local
court seeking either restitution or compensation.
268
In the Baltic states, compensation commissions review claims and
claimants may appeal an unsatisfactory ruling to the courts. 269 The
compensation schemes in the Baltic states typically require that former
owners submit claims before a deadline to local government authorities
with jurisdiction over the expropriated property.27 0 Depending on the
type of property, the designated period for filing claims varies in length
from four months to three years, although the governments have
retained authority to alter these deadlines. 27' Amongst themselves, the
260. See id. at 127, 134.
261. Gmurzynska, supra note 33, at 44-47.
262. Gelpern, supra note 135, at 348. In fact, the Hungarian National Compensation Office is
located in a building that was a brothel in the pre-Communist era, and the former owners have
asserted a compensation claim for the building. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 342. In cases where the government still possesses the expropriated property, the
claimant must file a restitution claim in a local court with jurisdiction. Id.
266. Id. Article 9 of the Federal Land Law requires a claimant seeking the return of land to file
a claim with a regional Land Office and serve notice on the holder of the land simultaneously. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See Foster, supra note 85, at 104-05 (discussing procedures in Latvia, Estonia, and
Lithuania).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 103. The governments retain the discretion to extend the deadline for allowing
claimants to obtain documents confirming their right to ownership. Id. at 103 n.71 (quoting
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Baltic states have differing methods of reviewing compensation claims.
Estonia authorized its State Property Department to create a special
commission to examine and rule on claims, to devise suitable proce-
dures, and to compile a register of previous owners and nationalized
properties. 272 Latvia delegates the authority to review claims to local
commissions appointed by municipal councils and grants final decision-
making power to executive committees of local councils. 273 Lithuania
has authorized agencies at different levels of government to review and
decide property claims depending on the type of property involved.2 74
In nationalizing most of its economy, Cuban expropriation was more
dramatic than those in Eastern Europe. Most Cuban claimants will have
to seek either restitution or compensation because the current economic
system does not in any way resemble private property ownership. A
post-socialist Cuban government should establish a government agency
to collect and to restore old records and to enact certain verification
standards for property claimants.
2. Technical Records
Tracing the chain of title to expropriated property will be important
for determining legitimate property claimants. In Germany, the Treu-
handanstalt has traced some title claims back to the 1930s when the
Nazi government instituted discriminatory expropriations without com-
pensation against Jews and foreign groups.
275
The availability of technical records documenting property ownership
has presented a major obstacle for the Treuhandanstalt as it reviews
compensation claims 2 76 because many property records in the former
East Germany have been lost or improperly maintained.27 7 By contrast,
Lithuanian Republic Law on Procedures for Restoration of Citizens' Right to Ownership of Extant
Real Property, art. 1 (June 8, 1991)).
272. Id. at 104.
273. Id. Albania has also enacted recent reforms authorizing a state to review all expropriated
property claims. Nash (Leich),supra note 114, at 97-98.
274. Id.
275. See Dodds, supra note 218, at 128, 130.
276. See id. at 127-28.
277. Some privatization agencies have broader responsibilities than merely adjudicating
property claims and maintaining records. The German Treuhandanstalt facilitates relationships
between former owners of business properties and other investors who want to renovate certain
properties and promote their development. Id. The Treuhandanstalt's policy, however, of guaran-
teeing every claimant the option of choosing restitution instead of compensation for his or her
expropriated property has created considerable confusion over who owns what property and has
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Polish records have been maintained in good condition as have records
in the Baltic states.
2 7 8
The Baltic states require that claimants submit appropriate documen-
tation that includes: legal evidence of ownership (will, deed, official
"confirmation document"), description, dimensions, location, estimated
value of property, name of claimant, and proof of relationship to original
owner. Lithuania also requires that claimants produce proof of citizen-
ship or permanent residence. 279 Hungarian compensation laws require
each claimant to submit an application form containing a description of
the property, the law under which it was expropriated, proof of citizen-
ship or residency at the time of expropriation, and-where the original
owner is deceased-proof of familial relationship to the original owner.
280
In Cuba, tracing the chain of title may be difficult as well because old
property records have not been preserved by the current government.
The Cuban government has kept poor records and even lost many of the
records that document property ownership prior to the 1959 revolu-
tion.2 8 ' Cuban property claimants probably will have to produce evi-
dence of ownership in order to validate their claims against any future
Cuban government. The Cuban government should therefore establish
a government agency that would serve as a depository of Cuban property
records. 28 2 Moreover, such an agency should assist potential foreign investors
by providing information on the status of expropriated properties.
V. A CUBAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
The Cuban and U.S. governments should sign an agreement vesting
authority to resolve all Cuban property claims with a Cuban-U.S. claims
tribunal. International law permits states to enter agreements granting
thereby deterred investment in those properties. Id. at 125-26. See also supra notes 218-22 and
accompanying text.
278. SeeJon L. Mills, Principal Issues in Confiscated Real Property in Post-Communist Cuba
27 (contrasting the availability of technical information in the former East Germany, Cuba, and
Poland) (unpublished paper submitted at Cuba in Transition: Options for Addressing the Chal-
lenge of Expropriated Properties, Annual Meeting of the American Bar Ass'n Section of Int'l Law &
Practice, Aug. 9, 1994) (on file with Law and Policy in International Business). See also Gmurzynska,
supra note 33, at 59.
279. Foster, supra note 85, at 104.
280. Gelpern, supra note 135, at 348.
281. Cf Consuegra-Barqufn, supra note 81, at 894 n.95 (noting that groups in Miami have
attempted to consolidate property claims).
282. Since the early 1970s, to satisfy the demands for better records, the Cuban exile
community has maintained a registry for Cuban property records in Miami. Id.
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broad jurisdictional powers to international tribunals. 283 Tribunals can
be authorized to determine which matters are subject to a state's
domestic jurisdiction or are regulated by international law, in accor-
dance with international law.
2 8 4
A. Presidential Authority to Settle Claims
U.S. law requires the "advice and consent of the Senate" for ratifica-
tion of a treaty.215 Previous U.S. claims tribunals and conciliation
commissions were approved as executive agreements, 286 which, like
treaties, are binding agreements with foreign nations. 287 But, unlike
treaties, executive agreements are concluded solely by the President and
are not subject to approval by the Senate.28 8 Such agreements reflect the
President's broad authority to conduct foreign relations under Article II
of the U.S. Constitution, but they have somewhat less authority under
U.S. domestic law.
289
It has long been the practice to allow the President to sign executive
agreements settling the claims of U.S. nationals and entities against
foreign governments. 290 The president's broad power to conclude such
lump sum settlement agreements, however, is not plenary.29 1 When Con-
gress views a settlement agreement as unfavorable, it has the power, though
rarely exercised, to enact legislation that modifies the agreement. 292 Con-
283. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 140, at 303.
284. Id.
285. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Although the text of the Constitution provides no answer to
the extent of presidential power in foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has recognized in a few
famous cases a broad executive power to conduct foreign affairs. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981).
286. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 88, at 221-27.
287. Executive agreements are constitutional acts of power that have as much legal validity as
treaties and congressional legislation. Executive agreements are the law of the land under the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause, Article VI, cl. 2. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230
(1942). Executive agreements account for fewer than 10% of U.S. international agreements.
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 22, at 185.
288. The president's power to make executive agreements derives neither from the Constitu-
tion nor from a delegation of congressional power but from the necessary attributes of a sovereign
state under international law. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-20
(1936).
289. Id. at 319-21.
290. Dames &Moore, 453 U.S. at 681.
291. Id. at 688.
292. See Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 245-47 (1983) (holding that the
diminution in value of U.S. company's property claim against foreign government that resulted
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gress exercised this power in 1981 to broaden the class of eligible claimants
under the Czechoslovakian settlement agreement.
293
B. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
OnJanuary 19, 1981, the United States and Iran reached agreement
for the release of the fifty-two American hostages by Iran and the release
of Iranian assets by the United States. The settlement agreement,
known as the Algiers Declaration, established a tribunal to hear the
claims of U.S. nationals against Iran and Iranian nationals against the
United States for debts arising from contracts, expropriations, or other
measures affecting property rights.2 9 4 The agreement comprised two
declarations of commitment: first, the release of all U.S. nationals held
.in Iran in return for a freeing of all Iranian assets held in the United
States, and second, a statement of general principles that included the
return of Iranian assets and the resolution of all U.S. claims against the
Iranian government arising out of the revolutionary government's expro-
priation of most foreign-owned assets during the period between 1979
and 1981.295
The agreement provided that non-bank claims against the Iranian
government and by Iran against the U.S. government be resolved
through binding international arbitration.2 96 The claims agreement
specified inter alia the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the procedure by which
arbitration panelists would be chosen, the applicable choice of law rules,
and the rules of procedure and evidence.
2 97
from president's negotiation of a lump sum agreement with foreign nation imposed no obligation
on U.S. government to compensate for the reduced value of the claim).
293. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
294. The Tribunal was established in 1981 pursuant to the Declaration of the Government of
the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (General Declaration), I Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3
(1981), and the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration), I Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 9 (1981), collectively referred to as the Algiers Declaration. For the text of the Algiers
Declaration, see Algiers Declaration, supra note 14.
295. Amin, supra note 14, at 750-52. The United States also pledged not to intervene in the
internal affairs of Iran. Id.
296. Id. The rules used for arbitrating disputes were the rules formulated by the UN
Commission on International Trade and Law (UNCITRAL). Id.
297. The settlement agreement between the United States and Iran (the Algiers Accords),
which created the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, provided that the substantive rules of law
would be the rules contained in the 1954 Iran-United States Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Treaty; in situations not covered by the treaty, international law would apply. Id. at 756-60.
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The Claims Tribunal started its work in 1981 at the Hague and had an
original dockett of 3816 claims. 298 It has held over 600 hearings and
pre-hearing conferences and has finalized over 4000 cases by award,
decision, or order.299 To date, the Tribunal continues to hear cases involving
complex issues of expropriation and valuation of property interests. Most
observers agree that the tribunal has successfully resolved disputes over
complex issues that may not have otherwise been resolved.3 °0
C. A Cuban-U.S. Claims Tribunal
A Cuban-U.S. claims tribunal could adjudicate all claims and apply
binding arbitration to all disputes arising from Castro's expropriation of
private property in Cuba. Such a claims process would take several years
but would provide stability and a realistic hope for expropriated inves-
tors to recover compensation for their lost property. To pay for such a
compensation program, the Cuban government could receive financial
assistance from international lending institutions and through adopting
economic and legal reforms with the assistance of U.S. investment and
trade.
30 1
Because of the President's broad authority to conduct foreign rela-
tions, a Cuban-U.S. claims tribunal could be authorized to issue rulings
that would have the effect of superseding the adjudications of the
FCSC.3 °2 The rulings of the FCSC would not be rendered useless,
however, because all the documentation it has maintained could still be
introduced as evidence before a Cuban-U.S. claims tribunal.30 3 Al-
though many U.S. claimants will oppose this solution because their
claims are now certified at the FCSC, a Cuban-U.S. claims tribunal in
conjunction with a vast economic restructuring of Cuban society is more
likely to provide compensation.
A Cuban-U.S. claims tribunal could be composed of a distinguished
panel of jurists selected from neutral third party countries.30 4 The
Cuban and U.S. governments could propose a list of jurists, which could
298. Norbert Wuhler, The Iran-United Slates Claims Tribunal, 8J. I.''LARB. 5, 14 (1991).
299. Id. at 5.
300. See id. at 5-6.
301. See supra Part IV.C.3.
302. See supra Part V.A.
303. The documentation of property claims on file with the FCSC would serve as a valuable
source of evidence for claimants who have been unable to find the necessary records and deeds that
should have been maintained by the Cuban government in local property registries.
304. The panel could be composed of fifteen jurists, which is the number ofjurists used by the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
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be supplemented by proposals from the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA) and ICJ at the Hague. In the event that the Cuban and U.S.
governments fail to agree on a sufficient number of jurists to serve on
the tribunal, the PCA or ICJ could appoint the remaining jurists.
The scope of jurisdiction for a Cuban-U.S. tribunal could include all
property claims and counterclaims of citizens or nationals of the United
States, regardless of when they acquired their U.S. status. The tribunal's
jurisdiction could also encompass the claims of Cubans who still live in
Cuba but who lost property after the Castro regime came to power, so
long as they have not already settled voluntarily their claims with the
Cuban government. Moreover, similar to the Iran-U.S. agreement, a
Cuban-U.S. tribunal could be authorized only to hear claims that have
an estimated value exceeding a certain amount.3 °5 Those claimants who
did not qualify could possibly have their claims heard by the FCSC or by
a newly-established Cuban privatization agency.
30 6
In addition to covering private property claims, some may suggest the
tribunal's jurisdiction be broadened to include the claims of one govern-
ment against the other government and the claims of nationals of one
state against the government of the other state. This would allow Cuban
citizens to file claims against the U.S. government. A tribunal with such
broad jurisdiction would no doubt please the Cuban government and
many of its supporters who could use their claims as an opportunity to
attack U.S. foreign policy and to claim hundreds of millions of dollars in
economic damages suffered as a result of the U.S. trade embargo. But
granting the tribunal overly broad jurisdiction could make the adjudica-
tion process so politicized that objective resolution of the expropriation
claims could not occur. The tribunal's jurisdiction should be limited to
the claims of U.S. and Cuban nationals whose property was expropri-
ated after the 1959 revolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reprivatization of expropriated property in post-socialist coun-
tries is always complex and contentious, and Cuba will be no different. A
post-socialist Cuban government must begin to resolve expropriated
property claims before it receives international financial assistance and
a lifting of the U.S. trade embargo. Cuba must be careful to implement
305. The Algiers' Declaration authorizes the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to hear
claims of $250,000 or more, whereas claims worth less than $250,000 are adjudicated before the
FCSC. Ridgway, supra note 30.
306. Under the Albanian-U.S. agreement, all U.S. claimants must submit their claims before
an Albanian compensation commission. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 27
RESOLVING PROPERTY CLAIMS IN A POST-SOCIALIST CUBA
a reprivatization program that resolves such claims in a manner that
does not deter foreign investment. The experience of other post-
Communist countries shows that reprivatization programs will fail if
they deter foreign investment and hinder economic growth.
In addition, Cuba is faced with particular difficulties in complying
with international law on expropriation. Although customary interna-
tional law has strict claimant eligibility rules, states may enter agree-
ments to broaden the scope of claimant eligibility. The international
minimum standard of state responsibility requires a state to pay full
value compensation to foreign owners of expropriated property, even
though jurists are not in agreement over the exact valuation formula.
Alien owners of property may abandon their property during a time of
necessity or force majeure without losing their right to bring a claim for
compensation because of a government expropriation.
Because of the irreversible changes that have occurred in Cuba over
the last thirty-six years, a resolution must occur in a context of national
and diplomatic reconciliation. Part of that reconciliation needs to be the
creation of a Cuban-U.S. claims tribunal, which will provide the most
equitable and practical way for Cuban and U.S. claimants to receive a
fair hearing. An impartial tribunal, coupled with economic reforms and
foreign assistance, may be the only way to entice the Cuban government
to adopt the necessary political reforms. In view of the problems
experienced by other post-socialist countries, a tribunal could serve the
function of efficiently resolving most property claims and thus facilitate
Cuba's transition to a market economy.
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